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MOTHER
Jrnaes J. Graham*
INTRODUCTION

f

HE recent inauguration of a new Chief Executive in Washington,
who has already indicated some willingness to try bold solutions
to the twin problems of welfare and poverty,' may help create a more
realistic political climate for liberals and conservatives. 2 Both groups
may be less eager to attribute spiralling increases in the "family" relief 3
*Associate Director, Project of Social Welfare Law and Adjunct Assistant Professor,
New York University School of Law.
, Robert H. Finch, Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
[hereinafter cited as HEW], implementing a campaign proposal by President Richard
Nixon, has called for the Federal Government to impose on the states national minimum
standards of payments to the nation's 8.5 million welfare clients. N.Y. Times, Feb. 3,
1969 at 1, col. 1. President Nixon also has appointed as a White House Assistant on
Urban Affairs the "urbanologist" Daniel P. Moynihan, who served as an official in the
Kennedy and Johnson Administrations and who advocates a system of family allowances
as a partial solution to the problem of poverty. Id.; see U.S. OFFIcE oF POLICY PLANNING
AND RFsEARCH, DEP'T OF LABOR, THE NEGRO FAMILY: THEt CASE FOR NATIONAL AeTIoN 21

(1965).
2 The columnist and influential leader of the Conservative Party in New York State,
William F. Buckley, Jr., and the conservative economist, Professor Milton Friedman
of the University of Chicago, who served as an adviser to Presidential Candidate, Barry
Goldwater, are among those who agree that the present system of cash assistance
distribution is both uneconomical and degrading to recipients. See M. FREDmAN,
CAPITALISM AND FREEDoM 191-94 (1962); Buckley, On The Right, Mr. Nixon's Welfare

Conmmission, N.Y. Post, Jan. 16, 1969.
3 This term refers to the federally aided but locally administered relief program,
Aid to Families with Dependent Children [hereinafter cited as AFDC] 42 U.S.C. § 601
[ 223 1
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categories to personal delinquencies rather than economic circumstances. 4
While only slightly over a year has elapsed since the enactment by
Congress of the most controversial 5 amendments in the history of the
public assistance titles of the Social Security Act,6 the advent of a Republican Administration justifies a fresh look at the provisions which impose a work requirement, inter alia,7 upon the mothers of small children.
(1964) and to local assistance measures, called in most areas "General Assistance" or
"Home Relief," available to needy families ineligible to participate in the federal program.
AFDC (known as Aid to Dependent Children prior to the 1962 Amendments) and
Old Age Assistance, 42 U.S.C. § 301 (1964), Aid to the Blind, 42 U.S.C. 5 1201 and Aid
to the Permanently and Totally Disabled, 42 U.S.C. § 1351 are commonly referred to as
the "categorical" assistance programs.
Nationwide, the number of AFDC recipients increased almost 400,000 (5,442,000 to
5,801,000) from January to September, 1968 or only slightly less than the increase for
the two-year period between January, 1964 and January, 1966. SOCIAL SECURITY BULL.,
Jan., 1969, at 59.
4 To date, apparently no studies have attempted to link low-wage levels in any given
area to the rise in costs of assistance. New York City's Human Resources Administrator,
Mitchell Ginsberg, recently announced that such a study would be sponsored by his
agency. N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1969, at 1. Fairly reliable inferences can be drawn,
however, even at the present time from the available raw statistics. For example, in
New York City the number of Home Relief recipients increased in 1966-1967 from 77,752
to 109,959, representing a rise in costs for assistance and care of almost thirty million

dollars. N.Y.

STATE BOARD

OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES,

1966-1967 ANNUAl. REPORTS (1968). The disparity in average monthly payments between New York City's HR and AFDC recipients indicates that the bulk of the increase may be attributable to intact family groups receiving supplementary instead of
total assistance because of inadequate incomes. N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF Soc. SERVS. 4
(Dec., 1968).
During roughly the same two-year period, almost 900,000 employees out of 2.2 million
in all of New York City's industries had gross cash hourly earnings of less than $2.25
o $90 per week or about $4,600 per annum. 2 N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF LABOR, STRUcruRE
OF EARNINGS AND HOURS IN NEw YORK STATE INDUSTRIES 57 (Aug., 1968). In early 1967,
the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the United States Department of Labor reported that
the New York metropolitan area had the second highest cost of living in the nation. The
Bureau did not make a "poverty level" determination but fixed at $10,195 the income
required to maintain a four-person (H-W, son-daughter) family, only the husband
gainfully employed, at a "moderate living standard." U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
DEP'T OF LABOR, CITY WORKERS' FAMLY BUDGr FOR A MODERATE LIVING STANDARD 9 (Sept.

1967).
5 Described by Mitchell Ginsberg, New York City's human resources administrator,
"the worst welfare bill in history." New York Times, Jan. 22, 1968 at 1. See also
Brager, Up the Down Escalator 'with Welfare, 13 SOCIAL WORK 121 (April, 1968).
6 Social Security Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. 90-249, tit. IL
7 The legislation requires that state plans for AFDC include provisions for the "prompt
referral to the Secretary of Labor or his representative for participation under a work
incentive program [(WIN) 1 . . . (i) . . . each appropriate child and relative.
42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (19) (A) (i) (Supp. 1968).
In accordance with the intent of Congress the Act does not list mothers of small
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We will consider whether individuals participating in the WIN (Work
Incentive) program are likely to acquire "a sense of dignity, self-worth,
and confidence which will flow from being recognized as a wageearning member of society;" 8 or whether, as Congress further intended,
"the example of a working adult in these families will have beneficial
effects on the children.
The experience to date, along with pertinent regulations issued nationally by HEW 10 and by administrators in New York" (a state with
relatively high benefits levels12), tends to confirm pessimistic predictions
made last year.' 3 The prediction was that WIN could not be implemented in benign fashion because the amendments, either explicidy or
because of their complexities, leave too much discretion to (economyminded) welfare officials and caseworkers,' 4 who would be influenced
children per se among the categories of AFDC recipients excluded from participation in
WIN. 42 U.S.C. § 602 (a) 19(A) IV-VII (Supp. 1968); see Senate Comm. on Finance,
90th Cong., 2d Sess., Brief Summary of Major Provisions and Detailed Comparison
with Prior Law 2 (Comm. Print 1968). The amendments, inter alia, also imposed
a "freeze" as of June 30, 1968 (later extended because of difficulties in implementation)
on the average number of dependent children for whose assistance and care the states
would receive federal reimbursement. The new maximum cannot exceed the same ratio
of dependent children to total state population which prevailed on January 1, 1968. 42
U.S.C. § 603 (d), as amended, Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 208 (b) (Supp. 1968).
842 U.S.C. §630 (Supp. 1968).
9 Id.
10 SOCIAL AND REHABILITATION SERV., HEW,1967 AMENDMENTS To mE SOCIAL SECURITY
ACT, INTERIm POLICIES AND REQUIREMENTS (1968).
11 N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF SOC. SERVS., MANUAL-BULL. TRANSMITTAL, TRANs. No. 68-1713-47,
BULL.No. 93 (Dec., 1968).
12In September, 1968, New York had the highest average monthly payment to
individual AFDC recipients ($62.70) as compared to California ($47.85), Virginia ($31.50),
Texas ($18.85), Mississippi ($8.50) and a national average of $41.35. SOCIAL SECURITY
BULL., Jan. 1969, at 60.
13 Vickenden, Social Security Amendments of 1967 [Pub. L. 90-248, tit. II], 12
Welfare L. Bull. 18 (Apr., 1968); See also A Working Paper on the Work Incentive
Program, Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law, Columbia University School of
Law; Availability for Work-An Evaluation and Comparison of the New Social
Security Amendments, Unemployment Compensation and Backpay Procedures Under
the ,NLRA, June 1, 1968 (an unpublished paper by Alan W. Houseman on file at
NYU Project on Social Welfare Law).
14 In public assistance administrative practice is "almost always worse than the
statute." Cloward & Elman, Poverty, Injustice and the Welfare State, 202 THE NATIO.N
230, 231 (1966). "Caseworkers, as much as any other group, are apt to find in the law
what they wish to find in it." A. KEITH-LucAs, DECISIONS ABOUT PEOPLE IN NEED: A
STUDY

OF ADMINISTRATIVE
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62 (1957).

See also

Handler, ControllingOfficial Behavior in Welfare Administration, 54 CALI. L. REv. 479
(1966); Graham, Civil Liberties Problems in Welfare Administration, 43 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 836 (1968).
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by the repressive character of the entire legislative package. 15
It is also contended here that the 1967 amendments, while not completely without merit, are no more likely 16 to achieve the expressed
social work objectives of the AFDC 17 (Aid to Families with Dependent
Children) program than the core provisions of the statute. Most states
with low per capita incomes' 8 pay token benefits under the AFDC program, despite the availability of federal matching funds 19 covering almost all of the cost. Some states, presumably will not be inclined to
spend more on job training and other services for recipients by a statute
which imposes a higher percentage of the assistance bill on the local departments.20
The WIN amendment, therefore, on its face 21 and in context of the
total legislation, especially the "freeze" provisions, 22 appears on balance
to be yet another form of social control compatible with our long his2
tory of equating poverty, vagrancy and idleness with moral turpitude. 3
15 Wickenden, supra note 13, at 18.
16 Most of the rash of welfare litigation in the past three years has been financed
by the War on Poverty. The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 includes legal services
among the Community Action programs focussed upon the needs of low income individuals and families. 42 U.S.C. § 2785 (a) (1964), as amended, (Supp. I, 1965).
17 Congress provides matching funds for state AFDC plans to help needy dependent
children and the parents or relatives with whom they are living to "maintain and
strengthen family life" and to "help such parents or relatives to attain or retain capability
for the maximum self-support and personal independence .. .". 42 U.S.C. S 601 (1964).

18 The complicated formula for federal reimbursement, entirely open-ended until
passage of the AFDC freeze, has the effect of paying higher sums to states with low
per capita incomes. 42 U.S.C. § 603, 623 (Supp. 1968).
19 In Alabama, Florida, and Georgia where AFDC payments average $12.65, $15.30,
and $23.60 respectively, the federal government pays more than seventy-six percent of
the costs of public assistance. Ohio, a comparatively prosperous state, as indicated by
the 48.4 percentage for federal reimbursement, pays $33.15 to its AFDC recipients or
less than the national average. SOcIAL SECURITY BULL., Ann. Statistical Supp. 1966, at
115,
116.
2
0 The statute authorizes the federal government to pay no more than 80% of the
costs in work training programs including costs of training, supervision, materials, administration, incentive payments, transportation, etc., but not for time spent by participants in work, training or other participation. For special work projects, however,
authorized under 42 U.S.C. § 632 (b) (3), only the costs of administration are included
in the reimbursement formula. 42 U.S.C. § 635 (Supp. 1968).
21 The statute conjoins the objectives of self-sufficiency through employment with
"preventing or reducing the incidence of births out of wedlock and otherwise strengthening family life." 42 U.S.C. 5 602(a) (15) (A) (Supp. 1968).
22
See note 7 supra.
2
S See tenBroek, California's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development
and Present Status (pts. 1, 2) 16 STAN. L. REv. 257, 900 (1964); (pt. 3) 17 STAN. L. Rv.
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The statute imposes new obligations and penalties on adult recipients
(and indirectly on children) for failure to comply.24 The work requirements perpetuate irrational discrimination. On the one hand there
are relief clients, the traditionally "unworthy" poor,25 who qualify for
cash benefits on account of need; on the other, there are those under
the National Labor Relations Act 26 and recipients of unemployment
insurance checks, 27 who qualify for government services or grants on
2
other grounds. 1
Finally, and perhaps most important, the WIN program will disappoint legislators who hope to cut costs and those reformers who equate
work opportunities with client rehabilitation. On their face and presumably in practice, the new provisions take no cognizance of the fact
that disparate benefits levels among the states,2 9 automation on southern
farms, followed by migrations to northern cities"0 for low-wage factory
employment, have much to do with the welfare crisis in cities like New
York."
614, 675 (1965); Rosenhein, Vagrancy Concepts in Welfare Law, 54 CALnF. L. REv.
511 (1966).
Vagrancy statutes are still found in almost every state: See Ricks v. District of
Columbia - F.2d - (D.C. Cir. 1968) in which the Courts reversing a criminal
conviction, declared a D.C. vagrancy statute unconstitutional on the grounds of
vagueness.
24The statute, in cases of refusal without "good cause" to participate in WIN,
provides for counseling and voucher payments to the delinquent for a sixty-day period
followed by termination of the individual's, but not the family's, budget allowance. 42
U.S.C. § 602(a) (19) (F) (Supp. 1968).
25 See S. Webb & B. Webb, English Local Government; English Poor Law History:
Part One: The Old Poor Law (1927) (hereinafter cited as Webb &Webb, Part One).
26 National Labor Relations Act § 8, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158
(1958). The National Labor Relations Board includes among its remedial functions
restoration of backpay and other benefits lost as a consequence of unfair labor practices
by unions or employers. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (c) (1958).
27 The Social Security Act since 1935 has provided for a system of unemployment compensation administered by the states as agents of the federal government and providing
for payroll tax contributions by employers, but not employees. 42 U.S.C. § 501 (1964).
28 For a discussion in depth of the dissimilar origins and character of work requirements in public assistance, the labor statute and unemployment insurance, see Mandelker,
Refusals to Work and Union Objectives in The Administration of Taft-Hartley and
Unemployment Compensation, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 477 (1959).
29 See note 12 supra.
30 See REPORT OF THE NAT'L ADVISORY CoM,'N ON CIVIL DISORDEaS 239, 240 (Bantam
ed. 1968).
31 See note 4 supra. During the period 1940 to 1963, the South lost 3.3 million nonwhite persons. About 1.4 million of these migrated to the Northeast. U.S. BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BuLL. No. 1511, THE NEGROES IN THE UNITED STATES:
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OF MOTHERS FOR EMPLOYMENT

The Statutory Purpose
Congress in 1967 included mothers of small children among the individuals deemed "appropriate" for involuntary referral 32 to a local
manpower agency 33 for participation in the WIN program. In so doing,
Congress departed from a long social work tradition that had been incorporated into the legislative history of the Social Security Act 34 and
mandated by HEW regulations.3 5 Experts theorized then, that while in
THEIR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONDITION 2 (1966).

A recent study of the New York City caseload found that approximately one-

third of the AFDC mothers were born in the South and about fifty percent in small
towns or on farms. L. PODELL, FAMILIES ON VELFARE IN NEW YORK CITY 25 (1968).
While no studies indicate that higher welfare benefits alone attract rural migrants to
the northern cities, the decline in AFDC caseloads in some southern states, contrasting
sharply with increases in the North, does create a strong inference that low-income,
potential welfare recipients have been encouraged to migrate by the knowledge that at
least poverty-level benefits will be available if employment opportunities do not materialize. For example, Alabama in December, 1964 had 77,071 AFDC recipients and
76,100 in January, 1968; South Carolina 29,591 and 28,500; North Carolina 112,019 and
107,000. Other Southern states, most notably Georgia, Louisiana and Virginia, showed
significant increases, however, during this period. Welfare in Review, Statistical Supp.
1965, at 4; Welfare in Review, May-June, 1968, at 43.
The United States Riot Commission estimated that approximately one million nonwhite persons in 1967 were "subemployed" i.e., working part time or employed at below
poverty level wages and living in the poverty sections of central cities. REPORT OF THEF
NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, supra note 30, at 252.
32 See note 7 supra.
33 SOCIAL AND REHABILITATION SERV., supra note 10, at 1. The Secretary of Labor
has designated the state employment security ("manpower") agency as the WIN
sponsor in each state, but if a particular agency is unwilling to serve or deemed ineffective, a non-profit organization may be designated as sponsor. MANPOWER ADMIN,
U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF WORK TRAINING PROGRAMS MANUAL, TRANS. NOTICE
No. 16-68, WIN SERIES No. 7-68 § 300 (1968) [hereinafter cited as WIN HANDBOOK].
34 The Committee on Economic Security, which proposed the first draft of the Social
Security legislation, noted in 1937 that "the purpose of ADC . . . has been to prevent
the disruption of families on the ground of poverty alone and to enable the mother
to stay at home and devote herself to housekeeping and the care of her children . . ."
SOCIAL SECURITY BOARD, SOCIAL SECURITY IN AMERICA: THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF THE

ACT AS SUMMARIZED FROM STAFF REPORTS TO THE COMMITTEE ON ECO233 (1937).
35 Prior to the 1967 amendments, the Bureau of Public Assistance took favorable
cognizance of the CES Report and said that since the role of AFDC is to "help the
mother arrive at a decision" whether or not to work, the Bureau recommended against
compulsory employment of ADC mothers. HEW HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE
ADMINISTRATION, pt. IV, § 3401.1 (1946).
SOCIAL SECURITY
NOMIC SECURITY
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many cases employment might be therapeutic for mothers and their
children at any income level, the decision should be left to the mother
herself. 36
A mother is usually in the best position to decide whether at all or at
what age her offspring will benefit from work activities she considers
both gainful and emotionally satisfying. The past deference in these
matters to the wishes of welfare mothers accorded with the American
disdain for arbitrary interference by government with intimate family
concerns.3 7 It is also true that the pre-1967 work exemptions for AFDC
mothers conflicted with the double standard, embodied in Anglo- American jurisprudence at the time of Queen Elizabeth38 and continuing to
the present time, 39 whereby humane parent-child concepts were deemed
40
inapplicable to the children of paupers.
The work compulsion feature of the 1967 amendments, like the
"freeze," 41 singles out the AFDC category. A sound argument can
See Mapes, The Mother's Employment, Whose Decision In ADC?, 8 PUBLIc WEL74 (Apr., 1950); de Schweinitz, to Work Or Not to Work-A Current Problem
Concerning Families Receiving ADC, 33 CHILD WELFARE 7 (Dec., 1954); Josselyn &
Goldman, Should Mothers Work?, 23 TiE FAMILY 74 (Mar., 1949); Riggs, Individualized
Employment Planning in ADC Families, 23 THE FAMILY 297 (Dec., 1942).
In fact, a fairly recent study by two sociologists concluded that even voluntary
maternal employment, though beneficial in many cases to both mother and children,
if engaged in full time might be harmful, especially among lower income groups,
because of the greater risks of neglect and the greater household burdens incurred by
children. F. NYE & L. HoFFMA,, TmE EMPLOYED MoTBER IN AMEICA, 196-198 (1963).
37 The United States Supreme Court has voided state legislation prohibiting interracial
marriages, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1968); interfering with the right to marital
privacy in birth control matters, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); denying
AFDC to otherwise eligible children because of the extra-marital sex activities of their
mother, King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
38 See WEBB & VEBB, PART ONE, supra note 25, at 22 n.3; B. TIERNaY, MEDIEVAL POOR
LAW: A SKETCH OF CANONICAL TnEORY AND ITS APPLICATION IN ENGLAND 37, 38 (1959).
39 New York State does not permit an AFDC mother to establish with bequest monies
or other resources available to her an irrevocable trust fund for the future education of
her children. Briggs-Hall v. Wyman, Index No. 03412/68 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. filed Feb.
29, 1968), reported in 13 WELFARE L. BuLL. 11 (June 1968). The Social Security Act,
however, permits, but does not require, "all or any portion of the earned or other income
to be set aside for future identifiable needs of a dependent child," 42 U.S.C. S 602
(a) (8) (B) (i) (1964).
In New Jersey and New York, welfare departments, seeking to recover costs of assistance, play an important role, often deleterious to the social welfare of clients, children
and spouses, in divorce and family court proceedings. See Graham, supra note 14, at
887-890.
40See tenBroek, supra note 23, at 286, 287, 315.
41See note 7 supra.
36

FARE
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be made that since the freeze provision bears no relation to need, 42 it
deprives AFDC children of equal protection of the laws. Yet employability obviously conjoins with the need for assistance and discriminadon on this score against AFDC mothers as opposed to the aged, blind
and disabled recipients of categorical aid, 43 might not be so arbitrary,
capricious or irrational as to violate the fifth amendment. 44 Moreover,
in Anderson v. Schaefer a federal court has held that there is no "federally protected right of a mother to refuse employment while receiving assistance and remaining at home with her children." 45 This
decision, when considered with the moderate penalties explicitly imposed
46
only on recipients who refuse to cooperate in the WIN program,
may encourage the enactment of, or validate existing statutes, that make
work refusal a criminal offense. New York courts in People v. Pickett47
and People v. La Fountain48 sustained the validity of a similar state misdemeanor statute 49 but qualified it with a requirement of "wilfulness,"
which was not satisfied by the defendants' work refusals in either case. 50
In the past, few such offenses were prosecuted in the courts, probably
because most states simply disqualified the entire family if the parent
42 The Alabama court struck down the state's "substitute parent" regulation as "unrelated to need . . . insofar as this or any similar regulation is based on the State's
asserted interests in discouraging illicit sexual behavior and illegitimacy it plainly
conflicts with federal law and policy." King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 320 (1968).
43 See note 3 supra.
44 Cf. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960), in which the Court upheld federal
legislation denying accrued benefits under the Old Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance title of the Social Security Act to an alien deported for membership in the
Communist Party at a time when such membership was not illegal. Id. at 635 (Brennan,
J., dissenting). In Nestor the Court also implicitly affirmed, however, the developing
notion that the government may not arbitrarily deprive citizens of benefits for which
they are otherwise qualified.
45 Anderson v. Schaefer, Civil No. 10443, (N.D. Ga., Apr. 15, 1968) (per curiam).
46 42 U.S.C. § 602 (a) (19) (F) (Supp. 1968).
47 19 N.Y.2d 170, 225 N.E.2d 509, 278 N.Y.S.2d 802 (1967).
48 21 App. Div. 719, 249 N.Y.S.2d 744 (1964).
49 N.Y. Soc. SERVS. LAW § 145 (McKinney 1966).
50In Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944), the United States Supreme Court struck
down a state work requirement imposed on debtors. Said the Court, "The undoubted
aim of the Thirteenth Amendment as implemented by the Federal Anti-Peonage Act
was not merely to end slavery but to maintain a system of completely free and voluntary labor throughout the United States .. ." Id. at 17. It is an open question, however,
whether the Court will apply the Pollock principle to the employable mother situation
when the prescribed penalty for work refusal, at least under the federal statute, is not
a prison term but discontinuance of benefits. The answer may depend on whether
the Court regards compulsory employment in welfare as simply a matter of economic
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refused to take a job.51 While this course of action presumably is foreclosed by the 1967 amendments, 52 the Anderson decision stands as a
strong precedent for the constitutionality of criminal statutes intended

to punish employable but recalcitrant male or female recipients. It is
also naive to suppose that AFDC children will not be adversely affected
by the sins of the parents whether he or she is incarcerated or causes

the family budget level to be lowered by elimination of the parent's
53

needs.

An attempt to strike down this portion of the WIN provisions in a
federal court on a supremacy clause theory, recently revitalized by

King v. Smith,54 probably would not succeed. Since 1956 the AFDC
title has specified "self-support," "self-care,"

"independence" and a

strengthening of family life as the principal purposes of this categorical
program.65 It is difficult to see how these objectives will be attained
in these situations where mothers are forced to leave home to work at

(to them) unsatisfactory employment. The alternative definition in
the statute of a needy, dependent child as one deprived of parental support or care56 reinforces the interpretation of the Economic Security
regulation by the states instead of an interference with a form of liberty protected by
the Due Process Clause. Cf. Snell v. Wyman, 281 F. Supp. 853, 873 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)
(Kaufman, J., dissenting).
51 This was the intended effect of the "substitute parent" and "employable mother"
regulations at issue in King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) and Anderson v. Schaefer, Civil
No. 10443 (N.D. Ga., Apr. 15, 1968).
According to one commentator, in Pickett the Commissioner of Welfare of St. Lawrence County admitted that he wanted a test case under N.Y. Soc. SEvs. LAw §145 (McKinney 1966)for the speedy prosecution of clients who refused to cooperate in work
relief measures. Mandell, The Crime of Poverty, 11 SocuAL WoRK 11, 12 (Jan., 1966).
52 See note 46 supra.
53 The practice in England of relieving the families of strikers but not the strikers
themselves, "one of the many anomalies of Poor Law Administration," had the effect of
relieving the strikers anyway. See Jennings, Poor Relief in Industrial Disputes, 46 L.Q.
REv. 225, 226 (1930), citing Attorney-General v. Guardians of the Poor in the MerthyrTydfil Union, 1 Ch. 516 (1900).
Other more poignant penalties may befall dependent children, spouses or parents. In
work refusal cases in New York City "it is the family's obligation to take the member
to court," apparently on the theory that "appropriate" mothers of small children
along with fathers and grown children will now be guilty of non-support for failure
to take available employment. New York City Department of Social Services, Procedure
No. 68-67, § II, c. p. 4 (1968).
54 See note 37 supra.
55 See note 17 supra.
5642 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1964). The statute also reads that matching funds are to be
used for "the purpose of encouraging the care of dependent children in their own homes
or in the homes of relatives .. " 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1964).
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Committee 7 that Congress conceived the program as a means of avoiding the further disruption of broken families resulting from mothers'
employment.
In litigation aimed at the supremacy clause, the views of HEW, the
federal agency entrusted with on-going approval of state plans for public assistance,18 will be relevant to the Supreme Court's decision. 59 The
HEW posture is not encouraging. Apparently out of concern for the
welfare of needy recipients, who would be penalized by a state's lawful
refusal to continue to participate in the basic program or by HEW's
decision to terminate aid to an offending state,60 HEIN has exercised
considerable restraint over the years and tolerated a wide, and sometimes conflicting 61 variety of dubious local welfare practices.
62
Although somewhat disingenuously in the light of its past conduct,
the agency in its amicus curiae brief 63 suggested that HEW require
states to avoid "unreasonable classifications unrelated to the purposes
57 See note 34 supra. In a report to the President in 1953, the Committee on Economic
Security advised that the Social Security legislation was intended "to release from the
wage earning role the person whose natural function is to give her children the physical
and affectionate guardianship necessary not only to keep them from falling into social
misfortune but more affirmatively to rear them into citizens capable of contributing to
society . . ." See KEiTH-LucAs, supra note 14, at 207.
58 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1964).
59 The court in King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968), took cognizance of the fact that
HEW had neither approved nor disapproved of the "substitute parent" regulation. Id.
at 317 n.l.
A constitutional attack upon New York's welfare repayment statutes [N.Y. Soc.
SERvs. LAW § 104, 104A, 105, 360 (McKinney 1966)] and related regulations was dismissed by a three-judge court in the Southern District of New York essentially on the
grounds that the laws, despite the hardships imposed on plaintiffs, constituted a reasonable exercise of legislative discretion. Snell v. Wyman, No. 191, (S.D. N.Y., Jan. 13,
1969). The HEW brief, though somewhat ambiguously, agreed with the majority. Brief
for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Snell v. Wyman, supra.
60 See G. STEINER, SOCIAL INSECURITY: THE POLITICS OF WELFARE 85 (1966); E. WITTE,
THE DEVELOPMENT OF TBE SOCIAL SECURITY AcT 144 (1962).
61 For example, an HEW analysis shows much inconsistency and no discernible patterns among states that recover the cost of welfare assistance. HEW, PUB. ASSISTANCE
REPORT No. 50, CHARACTERISTICS OF STATE PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PLANS UNDER THE SOCIAL
SECUITY AcT (1964); Graham, Public Assistance: The Right to Receive: The Obligation
to Repay, 43 N.Y.U.L. REV. 451 (1968).
62 Until the Anderson litigation commenced HEW had tolerated Georgia's "employable mother" regulation in all its parts for over twelve years, then prior to the final
court decision disapproved the regulation in a more benign form, revised at the request
of the federal court. Interview with Martin Garbus, Co-Counsel in the Anderson,
Snell and King litigation, Dec. 12, 1967.
63Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 59.
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of the Act." 61 It is significant that HEV as a matter of policy narrows
66
5
the scope of the supremacy clause argument upheld in King v. Smith
to contraventions of the requirements for state AFDC plans specified
in42 U.S.C. § 602 (a).67 In other words, despite its prior rejection of
forced employment, HEW presumably will yield to congressional wisdom in overseeing state operations and in giving the Supreme Court the
benefit of its expertise in litigation aimed at overturning the WIN provisions.

State Administrative Interpretations
Assuming that the legislation, as presently written, will withstand
constitutional assaults, does this foreclose the possibility that local administrators will blend the humane purposes into day-to-day implementation
of the WI N program? Probably, yes. It is true that the aggressive
implementation of an uncomplicated but weak statute" by the recently
created Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has achieved
dramatic results,6" generally upheld by the courts. 7 The perennial assaults by management groups on the National Labor Relations Board,
entrusted with legislation made deliberately ambiguous by Congress, 71
also testifies to the ability of an agency to effectuate broad national policies7 2 in a legislative vacuum. On the state level, the California welfare
64

1d. at 12.
65 Id.at 11, 12.
66 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
67 In addition to the WIN provisions, the more important of the explicit requirements for state plans include income "disregards," fair hearing requirements, statewide
uniformity and a single state agency to administer the plan. 42 U.S.C. § 602 (a) 1964.
68 EQUAL EipLommr OppoRurw ACr, 42 U.S.C. § 20003 (Supp. II, 1965-1966).
69 During the fiscal year ended June 30, 1967, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission completed 174 of 485 pending cases marked for agency conciliation efforts
and was fully or partially successful in over half of those completed. 2 EEOC ANN.
REP. 4 (1968).
70 Id. at 48-50; see Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp., 251 F.Supp. 184 (M.D. Tenn. 1966);
Hardy v. United States Steel Corp., 289 F. Supp. 200 (1967); International Chemical
Workers v. Planters Mfg. Co., 259 F.Supp. 365 (N.D. Miss. 1966).
71 National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended,29 U.S.C. 151 (1958).
For purposes of flexible administration, Congress did not specify in precise and unmistakeable language what conduct it intended to proscribe as unfair labor practices.
Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 798 (1945). At the same time "the
legislative history of [Taft-Hartley amendments, 19471 revealed that almost every provision reflected a compromise . . ." Ratner, The Quasi-judicial NLRB Revisited, 12
LAB.L.J. 685, 686 (1961).
72 The statute, ostensibly to prevent impediments to the free flow of commerce
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statute73 contains many progressive features, 74 but the California experience is atypical.
In part because of the Anglo-American tendency to equate welfare
poverty with dissolute living, reinforced by the usual apprehensions of
taxpayers and the traditional "less eligibility" concept 75 inherent in budget computations, state welfare administrators are unusually sensitive to
public pressures. 76 Charged with the care and feeding of a politically impotent sector of the population, county and state officials can be expected
to respond affirmatively to editorial demands that more and more AFDC
mothers be made to earn their keep.
Congress, of course, clearly indicated its intent to abolish the three
decade work exemption of AFDC mothers implicit in the Social Security
Act.77 Whatever the degree of collective sincerity among the Senators
and Representatives about shoring up human dignity among recipients,
there is no question that Congress regarded reduction in the rolls as
proof of rehabilitation. The freeze provision, for example, was a financial
sanction intended . . . "to get the States to act on the other provisions of
the bill requiring them to do something to reduce dependency and to
take people off welfare who should not be there." 1s Yet Congress
also failed to define "adequate" child care services, 79 "appropriate incaused by industrial strife, protects the right of employees to engage in "union" i.e.,
activities relating to collective bargaining, or to refrain from such activities. 29 U.S.C.
§ 157 (1959).
73 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE ANN. 5 10000 (West 1966).
74 The California Code explicitly provides prompt, humane and courteous administration, liberal construction of the statute, judicial review and payments without later reimbursement. Id. at § 10000, 10500, 11000, 10962, 11007.
75 This refers to the practice of attempting to encourage ambition by setting relief
payments at a level slightly below the earnings the recipient would receive if employed.
In 1847, the Poor Law Commissioners decided that children on "outdoor relief" i.e.,
assisted in their own homes, could not be educated at all out of the Poor Rates because
to do so would bring them to the economic level of the children of working men.
WEBB & WEBB, .upra note 25, at 249.
In England the principle retains its vitality even in a welfare state in the form of a
"wage stop" which restricts supplementary benefits in times of unemployment to a level
below wages from regular employment. Joint Economic Comm., 90th Cong., 2d Sess.,
Economic Policies and Practices, Paper No. 11, Guaranteed Minimum Income Programs
Used by Governments of Selected Countries 39 (Comm. Print 1968).
In the opinion of this observer, "less eligibility" also survives in this country in the
practice of almost all states of including only bare "necessities" in the welfare budget.
76 See KmTH-LucAs, supra note 14, at 84, 91, 99, 100.

77 See note 34 supra.
78 113 CONG. REc. 16585 (1967)

(Remarks of Congressman Mills).

7942 U.S.C. § 602(a) (15) (B) (i) (Supp. 1968); 42 U.S.C. 1622(a) (Supp. 1968).
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dividuals," so and "volunteers" 81 for referral, or to surround these and
other key provisions of the legislation, including the concept of suitable work opportunities for mothers, with due process safeguards compatible with the rehabilitative objectives of the legislation.82
To date neither clarification nor specificity has been provided by
HEW or the United States Department of Labor. In fact, the WIN
provisions omit two important provisions contained in Georgia's employable mother regulation that was sustained in substance by the federal
court in Anderson v. Schaefer, 3 namely, that the mother be "ablebodied" and without a child under three years of age. 84
Accordingly, much will depend on local discretion. In respect to decisions vitally affecting the daily lives of recipients, as Professor Joel
Handler astutely recognized, "caseworkers make the law." 85 One can
expect a flood of state court proceedings in the nature of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus attacking field determinations by caseworkers that
the welfare of certain mothers and their children will be enhanced by
the mothers' employment in a factory after the babies become toddlers;
or that a feeble grandmother is capable of supervising the lunchtime
and after-school activities of two or three boys aged from eight to
tvelve; or that the personal wishes, well-being and possible rehabilitation
of a grandmother or widowed aunt living in the home, best served by
attendance at embroidery classes or at a part-time job, have been sacrificed to a bureaucratic determination that the mother should work and
the relative stay home to baby-sit; or that a volunteer for referral who
later changes her mind has irrevocably categorized herself as appropriate
for participation in the WIN program.
Significantly, New York regulations state unequivocally "the preparation and motivation of recipients for participation in the WIN program
are basic responsibilities of the social services caseworker." 86 One can
assume that caseworkers, being only human, will react unfavorably to
clients who add to their work burdens by refusing to be motivated
towards employment.
80 42 U.S.C. 5 602(a) (19) (A) (i) (Supp. 1968).
8142 U.S.C. 5 602 (a) (19) (A) (iii) (Supp. 1968).
82 See notes 8, 9 supra.
83 Civil No. 10443 (N.D. Ga., Apr. 15, 1968).
84 GA. PUBLIC WELFARE ADrINISrRATION MA~uAL, pt. III, V-C(3) (b) (2)

(1964).
85 Handler, supra note 14, at 493. For similar criticisms of caseworker discretion in
compulsory employment programs, see Mapes, supra note 36, at 74; Josselyn & Goldman,
supra note 36, at 83.
88N.Y. STATE DE'T OF Soc. SERvs., supra note 11, at 111 A.1, at 3.
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Even with the aid of social work experts, 7 client attorneys can expect
to encounter enormous problems of proof in overcoming the presumption
in most states of administrative validity that inhere in caseworker divisions, ratified by higher level supervision. In this area, how can judges
be expected to draw a clear distinction between informed administrative
discretion implementing a national policy, and decisions in individual
cases motivated to an uncertain degree by personal bias of several kinds?
This last introduces into the discussion the unwholesome and intertwined
elements of racial or ethnic discrimination and social control.
Until the Poor Law Reform of 1834, welfare administration in England made no real distinctions in respect to care and confinement between abandoned children, as a class of poor persons, and destitute
vagrants and lesser criminal types.8 8 To this day statutes in many states
contain durational residence requirements for cash assistance which have
their origin in the Settlements Laws of Elizabethan England.8 9 In Mississippi, for example, a statute provides for the removal of "strolling
paupers." 90

Yet poverty in America, at least in this century, has had social connotations which have been accentuated in recent years by the migrations
of southern negroes, Puerto Ricans and Mexicans to the northern cities,
with the resulting principal focus of the War on Poverty and the welfare
crisis on black and Spanish-speaking indigents. The AFDC program
was enacted against a background of locally administered mother's
pension laws which were designed, even in states like New York, to
provide cash assistance to worthy (white) widows and their children."
87 Both the majority and dissenting opinions in Snell v. Wyman took cognizance of
the expert testimony of witness for the plaintiffs, Dr. Charles Grosser, then of the
faculty of the New York University Graduate School of Social Work, who testified
that the repayment provisions were therapeutically unsound and, in some cases, destructive of clients' morale. Snell v. Wyman, 281 F.Supp. 853, 859, 873 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
88 This was the principal focus of criticism of the reformer-novelist Charles Dickens,
who attacked the workhouse system in OLIVER TWIsT, BLEAK HousE and OUR MUTUAL
FRIEND. The Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834, 4 & 5 Will. 4, sought to provide
separate treatment for indigent children but in time the workhouses reverted to their
former condition. H. HousE, THE DICKENS WORLD 96, 98 (2d ed. 1942).
89 See WEBB & WEBB, supra note 25, at 308-22. The Statute of Laborers (c. 1350),
which was a consequence of the labor shortages resulting from the Black Plague,
arbitrarily fixed wages and hours for each category of laborers and craftsmen, forbade
alms-giving, restricted travel and forced all idle persons to work at the established
rates. Id. at 21, 397.
90 MISS. CODE ANN. § 7358 (1953).
91 W.

BELL., AID FOR DEPENDENT CHILDREN 9,

14 (1965).
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The "employable mother" regulations began to appear in the late
forties in the southern states in response to the insistence of the federal
government that negroes be accorded equal treatment in administra-

tion. 92 The Georgia regulation admittedly had a politico-racial origin.93
The regulation did achieve the desired objective, deplored by the chief
state welfare administrator, 94 of drastically reducing the number of black

unwed mothers on the rolls. 95 The black complexion of the employable
mother contingent in Georgia's rural counties also suggests that in practice, only non-whites were and perhaps still are, considered "suit-

able" for seasonal stoop labor mandated under the regulation. 96
Conceivably, in the absence of meaningful protections, caseworkers
will be permitted to give vent with impunity to blatant prejudices

against negroes in the South and North, Indians in the Southwest, Mexicans in California and Slovaks and Russians in parts of Pennsylvania. In

all areas of the country, the despised minority constituting the bulk of the
client caseload ipso facto will be deemed by many caseworkers pre-

sumptively "suitable" for work of any kind. Where illegitimate children
are involved, caseworkers will be able to "punish" such mothers for their
immoral conduct while satisfying an explicit objective of the WIN
program of "preventing or reducing the incidence of births out of
wedlock." 97
THE NATURE OF THE TRAINING AND EmPLOYMENT

Role of the Labor Department
Under the 1967 amendments, after the state welfare agency determines

that an individual is "appropriate" for work and training, the manpower
agency98 assumes responsibility for supervision of the recipient. This
92

Id. at 35.

93 id. at 43, 46, 67.
94 See GA. DEP'T OF FAMILY AND CHILDREN SERVS., REPORT FOR

FiscAL YEAR 1964-1965,
at 92 (1965).
95 In 1952-53 the state expended $10,681,016 on AFDC, a drop of over one million
dollars in one year attributed in part to the new regulations. Closings increased 33.78%
of which 5.6% was attributed to the compulsory work requirement alone. GA. DEP'l
OF FAMILY AND CHILDREN SFRvs., supra note 94, at 9, 16.
96 During the Anderson v. Schaefer litigation, co-counsel for the plaintiffs was advised
by his clients, who resided in two Georgia counties, that they knew of no white women
working in the fields at stoop labor. S. Wizner, Memorandum Summarizing Depositions, June 10, 1967, on file at the Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law, Columbia
University School of Law.
9742 U.S.C. § 602(a) (15) (A) (ii) (Supp. 1968).
98 See note 33 supra.
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includes determinations at fair hearings as to whether the individual
refused for "good cause" 99 to participate in the WIN program.'

The

welfare agency, of course, continues to compute and distribute the
basic assistance payment.'' This worthwhile departure from past practice holds much potential for administrative reform.

The introduction of Labor Department personnel into the welfare
sector has both practical and philosophical advantages. The former

jurisdiction by state welfare units over the income maintenance of all
recipients, whether or not employable, was a Poor Law anachronism.
Congress and President Franklin D. Roosevelt, perhaps because of the
"radical" image projected by Secretary Frances Perkins and her associates,0 2 refused to concur in the recommendation of the Economic

Security Committee, that Aid to Dependent Children be administered
by the Department of Labor instead of the Social Security Administration.0 3 This decision was deplored by the Senate Finance Committee

as being out of step with labor-welfare policy in the rest of the indus04
trialized world.
The Department of Labor enjoys a reputation among legal practitioners, unionists and employers as being an aggressive yet efficient and non-

partisan unit of the executive branch.

5

The experience of its per-

(Supp. 1968); WIN HANDBOOK § 412(H).
100 In New York, and presumably elsewhere, the recipient also has the right to contest
preliminarily her "appropriateness" for referral at the usual welfare department fair
hearing. N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF Soc. SERVS., supra note 11, at §111I, at 11. In addition,
prior to the manpower agency hearing, the circumstances of the refusal to participate
will be assayed by a Determination Review Committee vested with broad powers.
WIN HANDBOOK § 412(G).
101 SOCIAL AND REHABILITATION SERv., supra note 10, at 8.
102 See A. ALTMEYER, THE FoRMAnTIvE YEARS OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 35 (1966); P. DoUGLAS,
9942 U.S.C. § 602(a) (19) (F)

SOCIAL SECURITY IN THE UNITED STATES: AN ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL OF THE FEDERAL
SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 85 (1936).
103 CES included Secretary of Labor Perkins, and the Secretary of the Treasury

Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Attorney-General Homer S. Cummings, Secretary of Agriculture
Henry A. Wallace and Federal Emergency Relief Administrator Harry C. Hopkins.
COMM. ON EcoNoMic SECURITY REPORT, supra note 34, at Introduction; see Steiner, supra
note 60, at 19.
104 SENATE FINANCE COMm. REPORT No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st. Sess. § 5 (1935). The
decision to deny jurisdiction to the Department of Labor was particularly ironic and
unfortunate because the American social security package derived more from our
labor legislation than public assistance, whereas in Great Britain "development of social
security was influenced largely by dissatisfaction with the Poor Law." ALTmETER,
supra note 102, at VII.
105 This comment stems from the author's prior experience as a labor law specialist,
including representation during 1963-1966 of an industrial union for the most part in
the deep South.
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sonnel in implementing national policy regarding unemployment compensation, migrants, child-labor, minimum wage laws, union elections
and labor-managing reporting will add a refreshing new dimension to
the highly specialized world of welfare administrators. As a group,
these administrators tend to remain isolated from the economic and
political mainstream." 6 It is relevant on this point that fair hearings
on work refusals will be conducted by unemployment insurance examiners 17 or comparable officials in accordance with the usual Unemployment Insurance rules, regulations and procedures.
This familiarity with the rights, obligations, income and educational
problems of workers should on balance overcome the agency's lack of
social work expertise. In fact, in the context of poverty level budgets
and widespread repressive welfare requirements, innocence of social
work principles may be an advantage in public assistance administration.
At the same time, the continued involvement of the Labor Department
in this sector may help create a new psychological climate in labor
circles, whereby trade union leaders will be encouraged to assume a share
of the responsibility for individuals in the work force and their dependents. 08 While it is true that AFL-CIO lobbyists in Washington generally support most "liberal" legislation, and the Federation did actively
oppose the 1967 amendments, 109 as of this writing it is fair to say that
few local units have made significant contributions to the War on Poverty or to public assistance reform. In this as well as other matters the
modern American labor experience contrasts sharply with patterns
established across the Atlantic.
106 See KEr-H-Lucas, supra note 14, at 84, 91; STEiNmR, supra note 60, at 193.
107 WIN HAsmBooK S 412(I) (1).
108 One commentator attributed the history of antagonism of labor towards social

welfare in part to the fact that public and private relief agencies developed "out of the
womb of feudal charity." Deutsch, Get Together Labor and Social Welfare, 9 SocIL
WoRK TODAY 13 (April, 1942).

Representatives of organized labor gave restrained support to the legislative package
in 1935 and had almost no role in its formulation. See Wrrr, supra note 60, at 87;
DoUGLAs, supra note 102, at 4.

109Federation representatives reportedly were prepared to sacrifice increases in
OASDI benefits if this would have sufficed to defeat the freeze and compulsory employment measures. Keeping the Record Straight, Letter from Jean Rubin, Child Welfare
League of America, 13 SocLAL WoRt 125 (July, 1968). Cf. Dunlop, Unemployment and
the Unions, 2 HARV. REc. 29 (1964). Prof. Dunlop, taking a minority point of view,
argues that in recent years many labor unions have increased their activities "in the role
of counselor and advisor to their members aiding them in securing... public assistance."
Id. at 32.
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In England, the Radical journalist William Cobbett, writing about
1833, provided the ideology for an alliance at the turn of the century
between organized labor and intellectuals, including the Fabian Socialists
Sidney and Beatrice Webb." 0 Medieval lands, according to Cobbett,
had been held in trust by the church for the poor."' Although later
confiscated by the state, the English peasant or worker class could still
assert its land claims in the form of Poor Law assistance." 2 English
unionists in this century came to recognize their responsibility for the
care of the "once employed." They played a major role, after successive extensions of the unemployment insurance concept, to cover more
and more of the relief population' in establishing a universal assistance program in that country. By contrast, in the United States the lack
of "class consciousness" coupled with greater opportunities than in
Europe for poor children to rise from "rags-to-riches" fostered a union
movement oriented almost exclusively towards increased benefits for
current members and eschewing, at least on the local level, socio-political
involvement. The process has been most evident in the South where
a lack of "working-class" consciousness has hampered union organizing." 4 However, when southern workers do vote for collective representation, it has been my experience that they tend to be more active
than their brothers in the northern cities in union affairs and more likely
to regard the union as part of the life of the community.
The Placement Process
The rules laid down by the Department of Labor for the guidance of
local manpower agencies accurately reflect the inherent difficulties of
attempting to implement harsh legislative policy in humane fashion. The
WIN Handbook contains a mixture of well meaning, but jaded, social
work concepts together with policies or procedures civil libertarian in
5
origin or apparently borrowed from the Economic Opportunity Act."
The resulting conflicts derive from the unspoken necessity of acquiescing
110 See K.

DESCHWEINITZ, ENGLAND'S

ROAD

To SOCIAL SECURITY

SON, THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH WORKING CLASS

173 (1943); E. THoMr-

518, 592 (1963).

III Thompson, supra note 110, at 222, 761.
112 Id.
113 See DESCHWEINITZ, supra note 110, at 197-222; J. MILLETT, THE BRITISH UNEMtPLOyMENT ASSISTANCE BOARD: A CASE STUDY IN ADMINISTRATVE AUTONOMY 17-22 (1940).
114W. CASH, THE MIND OF THE SOUTH 252-56 (1941).
'15

The Economic Opportunity Act stresses self-help measures including "maximum

feasible participation" of the poor in Community Action programs. 42 U.S.C. § 2782 (a)
(3) (Supp. II, 1965-1966).
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in the general intent of Congress to cut welfare costs and the explicitn
directive to include mothers among the referrals to jobs and training."
For example, the Handbook recommends"" that the "first level staff
(those who actually deal with enrollees)" should be organized on a fiveman team basis consisting of a counselor, manpower specialist, work
and training specialist, coach and clerk stenographer."18 The local sponsor is encouraged to train enrollees who have demonstrated "leadership
and interest" to work on the WIN staff.1" 9 A representative of the poor
"preferably recommended by an appropriate community action agency"
should be one of the three members of the Determination Review Committee. 2° This committee is but one element in the comprehensive
schema for initial determinations, review and fair hearings on refusals of
enrollees to participate.Included in the WIN Handbook, however, are numerous provisions
for rehabilitative "services" first introduced, with great but unfulfilled
expectations,' 2' into the Social Security Act of 1962. The team counselor
is charged with providing "the full array of professional, vocational and
personal counseling services." 122 "Supplemental supportive services,"
not provided by the local welfare agency, may be obtained by the
sponsor or a consultant on a contractual basis; these may encompass
services from "clinical psychologists, psychiatrists, rehabilitation centers,
evaluation and appraisal clinics, etc." 123 When enrollees refuse to cooperate, the counselor should make exhaustive efforts to explain the
"benefit of participation and the consequences of refusal." 124
The layman may rightly inquire how a social worker or clinical
psychologist, especially in the face of contrary social work teaching, 23
can deliver therapeutic services to the mother who went on welfare
116 The WIN program has application to "mothers who do not volunteer whether or
not they have pre-school children." WIN HANDBOOK § 407.
M While some of the provisions are clearly mandatory in nature, much of the
language in the WIN HANDBOOK has a hortatory tone.
118 WIN HANDBOOK § 301 (E) (2).
1t9 Id. at § 303.
120 Id. at § 412 (G). One of the other committee members "shall be familiar with
jobs and skills requirements and one shall be familiar with the social and economic problems of WIN enrollees." Id. An on-the-job grievance procedure also is provided which
apparently does not include a fair hearing. Id. at § 416.
121 See STIEiNE, supra note 60, at 19, 42-46; see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 603(c) (1) (1964).
122 WM HANDBOOK § 301.
123 Id. at § 301(F).
124 Id.
125 See note 36 supra.
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after her husband left home because he could not support his family, 26
and who now insists that her children need her during the day. The
answer seems to be that the WIN professional, ignoring economic data
and other evidence, must proceed on the assumption that his clients
are somehow socially inadequate or morally deficient. The Department
of Labor advises its personnel that WIN is designed to deal with persons
who are not employed steadily and may not accept ordinary appeals for
27
proper discipline.

Moreover, owing to the prevalent economy base of most welfare
policies, the services described by the Handbook were often transformed
in the past into services beneficial only to the local department 28 or, in
any event, were regarded with antagonism by clients principally desirous
of higher budget levels.'2 9 It would seem that the emphasis on services,
together with the publicized, even if never fully implemented, 3 1 policy
of placing mothers with pre-school children in jobs or training, will create
a permanent psychological block to successful rehabilitation for individuals or groups of recipients' 8 ' under the WIN program.
Finally, the WIN program proceeds on the implicit assumption, derived from the economy base of the legislation, that work or training
126 On the basis of substantial evidence that lack of welfare assistance to intact
families is a factor in family dislocations, the Kerner Commission recommended that
the program of temporary AFDC to families with unemployed breadwinners be made
permanent and mandatory on all states. REPORT OF THE NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON,
CIVIL DISORDERS, supra note 30, at 463. Instead, Congress further restricted coverage of
T-AFDC (also called "AFDC-U") to unemployed fathers with substantial attachment
to the work force. 42 U.S.C. § 607 (Supp. 1968).
127 WIN HANDBOOK § 413 (A).
128 See Graham, supra note 14, at 885.
129 Id.
130 On this score, the solicitous language in the New York regulations, for example,
called for special consideration for mothers of several children, may be somewhat misleading on the question of implementation. N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF Soc. SERVS., supra note
11, at § 111F. One clients' group representative reported that in one week in January,
1969, she counted about 45 AFDC mothers in a Brooklyn welfare center waiting for
WIN counseling. Brooklyn Welfare Action Council Newsletter, February 7, 1969, at 1.
The New York City Department, as of the end of 1968, admittedly for administrative
reasons, had lagged behind the rest of the State in WIN referrals but expected soon to
fulfill its allotted quota of 8,400 "job training slots." New York Times, February 14,
1969.
181 "Whip the WIN Program. The Department of Social Services calls it WIN but
the welfare rights movement calls it WIP. If you are a client you better join a welfare
rights group, because WIP has something in store for you. ....Are you going to let
the Department tell you where and when to work and who to leave your children
with?" Brooklyn Welfare Action Council Newsletter, January 24, 1969, at 1.
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will either be actually available 13 2 or will be made available by the manpower agency. The state welfare plan must provide for "prompt" referral. 33 The Secretary of Labor "shall" establish a WIN program
wherever a "significant" number of individuals over age 16 are on the
AFDC rolls. 13 4 Congress left almost no room for avoidance of its overriding legislative purpose. Such programs must place as many individuals "as is possible" in employment; on-the-job training will be utilized
for "others." Institutional and work experience training and special work
projects encompass the remainder. 135
The broad criteria specified by the Congress for placements are clearly
not the number of recipients employable in the sense of past federal
policy, or the number of available jobs of any kind, but instead, the size
and consequent expense, of the welfare caseload. It follows, therefore,
that in many parts of the country the manpower agency, with the acquiescence of the Department of Labor, will have no choice but to effectuate the statutory intent by first placing employable mothers in lowwage factory jobs"36 or, more likely,1 7 as domestics. Both placements
will add to the indirect subsidies already provided by local governments
to these industries in the form of welfare supplementation to employees.
Employment on a large scale of AFDC mothers as maids will have the
132Se SNATE COMm. oN FINANCE, supra note 7, at 3. The statutory priorities for
referral [42 U.S.C. § 602 (a) (19) (A) (Supp. 1968)] will have little meaning in the approximately 28 states, including New Jersey and Virginia, that do not participate in the
unemployed parent segment of the AFDC program. See WELFARm IN REviaw, Nov.-Dec.,
1968, at 42.
133 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (19) (A) (Supp. 1968).
13442 U.S.C. § 632 (a) (Supp. 1968).
135 42 U.S.C. § 632 (b) (Supp. 1968).
136 1 have been advised, however, by the Director of the Department of Welfare of
Richmond, Virginia, Mr. Herbert G. Ross, that the employment service in his community follows a policy of placing employable AFDC clients in jobs with potential
for "upward mobility." While Mr. Ross agrees with the rehabilitative objectives of the
manpower agency, he feels that the success or failure of this approach will depend upon
whether Congress will support sound, long-range employment planning or, instead, will
insist on quick and probably temporary placements. Interview with Herbert G. Ross,
Director of the Dep't of Welfare of Richmond, Virginia, by telephone, Jan. 29, 1969.
In another connection, Mr. Ross has advocated closer cooperation between federal,
state and local agencies and university and other groups seeking progressive reforms
in "social welfare law." H. Ross, Disclosure of Information in Public Assistance, the
Concept of Direct Connection with Administration 135 (1968) (unpublished treatise for
M.S.W. degree, School of Social Work, Richmond Professional Institute).
137 Winifred Bell contends that employable mother policies were encouraged, at least
in part, by the need and desire for housemaids. BEL., supra note 91, at 64. See also Brager,
supranote 5, at 121.
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additional social disadvantages of adding to the low-income work force
and thus aggravating the problem of negro family dislocation 118 by
9
further depressing male factory and service wages generally.Y1
In the alternative, the manpower agency must resort to work experience and training or special work projects. Absent a significant increase in decent job opportunities or a rise in unskilled or semi-skilled
wages to realistic levels, these projects in some areas will degenerate into
make-work. Make-work will fail to satisfy the expectations of Congress
while frustrating the affected recipients.
While the statute requires the Secretary to enter into agreements
according him the right inter alia to have necessary access to the employer's premises to supervise compliance by the employer with the
project agreement, 4 ' the only firm standard imposed for such projects
41
is conformity to the applicable minimum wage for the particular work.
Instead, Congress simply directed in relevant part that the Secretary
have "reasonable assurances" that "appropriate" standards for health
safety, etc., be established and maintained and that the conditions of
work, training, etc., be "reasonable" in the light of such (locally determined) factors as the type of work, geographical region, and proficiency of the participant. 42 Clearly, Congress did not intend to disturb
regional, sometimes ethnically or racially oriented, work patterns prob143
ably not cognizable under the Equal Employment Opportunity Act.
138

See U.S.

OFFICF

OF POLICY PLANNING AND

RESEARCH,

supra note 1, at 21.

One

critic of the Report argues that too much stress was placed on the heritage of slavery
and not enough on post-slavery economic deprivations as factors in Negro family instability. "Vhat these families need most is jobs for Negro men-jobs with status, with
stability, with future, and with fair wages." Herzog, Is There A Breakdowan of the
Negro Fandly? 11 SOCIAL WORK 319 (Jan. 1966).

Statistically, a strong case can be made for the theory that the disproportionately
high rates of Negro divorce, abandonment and illegitimacy and consequent AFDC dependency relate directly to male employment at low wages. While 6 out of 100
white families with male heads are likely to become poor, the comparable figure for
non-whites is 24 out of 100, only 7 units below the estimate for white families
with female heads. SENATE SuBcoMM. ON EMPLOYMENT, MANPOWER, AND PovErTY,
90th Cong., 2d Sess., TowARD EcoNoMIc SECURITY FOR THE POOR 10 (1968).
In 1966, Negro high school graduates nationwide earned on the average approximately
$230 per annum less than white men who never entered high school. WELFARE IN REvIEW,
Mar.-Apr., 1968, at 20, citing U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports,
Series P.-60, No. 53, Income in 1966 of Families and Persons in the United States, tables
7, 21 (1967).
139 See Mandell, supra note 51, at 14, 15.
140 42 U.S.C. § 633 (e) (2) (C) (Supp. 1968).
14142 U.S.C. § 633 (e) (4) (Supp. 1968).
142 42 U.S.C. § 633 (f) (Supp. 1968).
143 In enforcement litigation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
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Large scale experiments in work relief as a form of compulsory employment were tried unsuccessfully by England 144 and the United

States

45

prior to this century. A study made by the Bureau of Family

Services (HEW) in 1961 concluded that work relief could only reduce
the assistance rolls appreciably if the economy produced additional reg-

ular jobs for the truly employable, i.e., those with "constructive work
relief experience." 146 This is so, said the Bureau, because "projects useful to the community are more likely to interfere with regular employment." 147

Justifications for Refusals
Determinations by the Secretary of Labor after a fair hearing, that a

recipient has refused without good cause a bona fide offer of employment,
are binding on the welfare agency. 48 This separation of authority would
probably work well for most recipients if mothers of small children

were not involved. The focus of the expertise of the delegate manpower
or underemployed 149 males will be clouded and the labor-managementdistrict courts generally have found no violations of the Act, absent a present intent to
discriminate where current disparities, for example, in requisite skills, result from
invidious discrimination in the past. Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F.Supp. 505
(E.D. Va. 1968).
144 See WEBB & VEBB, Part One, supra note 25, at 212, 223. The Poor Law Reformers
of 1834 intended to "enoble" the poor by discouraging them from applying for relief.
Despite the reforms which included bare subsistence budget levels and residence in the
workhouse, the English welfare rolls increased disportionately during the next several
decades. HousE, supra note 88, at 96; S. WEBB & B. WEBB, ENGLISH LOCAL GOVERNMENT:
ENGLISH POOR LAW HISTORY, PART Two, THE LAST HUNTDRED YEARS 247 (1929).
145 In an 1881 decision, Judge David Brewer of the Kansas Supreme Court (later a
Justice of the United States Supreme Court) denied a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus brought by a farmer for the release of his son from a "poor farm." The son,
aged 8, had been "bound out" until the age of 18 by the superintendent of the farm
without the knowledge or consent of his parents after the father, during a drought and
while ill, bad sought aid for his family. Judge Brewer was sympathetic but held that
Kansas law permitted such administrative measures even in cases of temporary assistance
and contained no requirement for notice to or consent of the parents. Ackley v. Tinker,
26 Kan. 485 (1881).
146 Cited in Houseman, supranote 13, at 7.
147

Id.

148 42 U.S.C. § 602 (a) (19) (F), 633 (g) (Supp. 1968); SOCIAL AND REHABILITATON SERV.,

supra note 10, § 3 (A) (17) at 9.
149 This term has been used to describe the condition of ten million American nonwhite persons, "about 6.5 million of whom work full-time and earn less than the annual
wage." REPORT OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC CommirEE, supra note 75, at 7. "The concentration of male Negro employment at the lowest end of the occupational scale is greatly
depressing the incomes of United States Negroes in general. In fact, this is the single
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male-worker orientation of its personnel set somewhat askew to the extent
that large numbers of AFDC mothers appear among the agency's clients.
In other words, day-to-day concern with the employable mother component of the WIN program, potentially the largest group of referrals
from the welfare department, 5 ' may impress the damp moss of Poor
Law paternalism on an otherwise vital manpower organization.
For example, ascertaining the merits of job rejections, harmful from
the recipient's point of view to his or her "economic welfare," 161 would
seem to fall within the exclusive purview of the manpower agency. Yet
the criterion of "health and safety of the individual or family members" 152 suggests the need for social work expertise. Clearly, a determination as to whether "acceptance of the assignment would be detrimental
to the family life of the individual" 151 invades the on-going jurisdiction
of the welfare department over the employable mother.
Also included among the criteria for good cause refusals in the WIN
Handbook is a determination that "a mother's child care plan has broken
down and alternative child care cannot be arranged and she can no
longer participate in the program." 114 To begin with, child care arrangements will have been made or approved by the welfare unit, so
that work refusals relating to this factor will require consultations between the two agencies. The nature of baby-sitting would indicate
that, instead of a permanent disruption of the child care plan, manpower
personnel will find themselves confronted by recurring complaints from
mothers and employers that the baby sitter inexplicably failed to appear
and cannot be located.
The .psychic, as well as economic, harm'5 5 befalling the mother and
most important source of poverty among Negroes." REPORT OF THE NAT'L ADVISORY
COMM'N ON CIVIL DisoRrDnCs, supra note 30, at 255.
150 In September, 1968, AFDC mothers constituted almost 40 percent (approx. 1,500,000)
of the total number of adults enrolled nationwide in the categorical assistance programs.
SOCIAL

SEcutrrvy BULL., Jan., 1969, at 60.

151 WIN HANDBOOK §412(E) (1) (m).
152 Id. at § 412(E) (1) (o).
153 Id.at § 412 (E) (1) (n).
154Id. at § 412 (E) (1)

(g).
HEW agrees that the statute leaves "considerable latitude" to the states to define
what constitutes good cause for refusal to accept employment, and to decide whether
a bona fide, reasonable offer of employment has been made. HEW, HANiDBOOK OF
PUBLIC ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION pt. IV, § 3424.23 (1963).
155 Presumably, either in a special work project or regular employment, the lost
time will be deducted from the mother's paycheck. While most of this substantial
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her children from these interruptions in her daily schedule and flow of
income, will be added to the usual tensions between client and caseworker over special allowances and recurring budget computations. 56
As for the agencies, in such situations the welfare worker must resolve
the child-care difficulties, but the placement official is responsible to all
concerned parties for satisfaction of the employment obligation. It is
fair to assume, therefore, that in most cases the manpower agency, already under pressure from the tax paying public and elements in the
business community, will resolve conundrums of this kind by placing
mothers with small children in casual, low-paying jobs as domestics,
hotel service employees, or even as farm laborers. 157
This practical consequence will also be hastened by the failure of the
statute not only to descry "appropriate" jobs or work standards for the
mass of employable recipients'51 8 but also to specify criteria catering to
the desires, maximum skills or past employment of the indisiduals referred for training or employment.' 59 What happens to the AFDC
mother who worked for good wages as a skilled stitcher in a New
Orleans garment shop, but comes to the WIN program unemployed and
on welfare because of a strike at her shop? 6 ' In the light of the "good
cause" provisions of the statute, the WIN Handbook and the social
control' 61 and economy'6 2 purposes of the 1967 amendment, one may
anticipate (despite the rehabilitative objectives also specified for the WIN
program' 63 ) that manpower agency personnel at the field and fair hearing levels will not deem themselves empowered to permit the New
Orleans stitcher to wait perhaps two or three months for retraining and
(to her) loss of income will be compensated by an adjustment in the budget, this
procedure, calling for special efforts on the part of the caseworker, might consume four
or five days on each occasion, an intolerably long period of time for a family subsisting
on little more than a "bare survival allowance."
56
' See Graham, supra note 14, at 890-92.
157 But see note 136 supra.
15842 U.S.C. § 633(f) (Supp. 1968).
159 The statute specifies that the conditions of work training, education and employment must be "reasonable in the light of such factors as the type of work, geographical
region, and proficiency of the participant." 42 US.C. § 633 (f) (3) (Supp. 1968). Past
experience is an important, and presumably deliberate, omission from the recital.
160 Women fitting this description were probably typical of the approximately 170
discriminatees who were awarded, but have not yet received, backpay in NLRB litigation that commenced in 1955 and is still pending in the federal courts. NLRB v. J.H.
Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 399 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1968).
16142 U.S.C. § 602(a) (15) (A) (ii) (Supp. 1968); see note 21 supra.
162 See text, supra note 78.
163 42 U.S.C. S630 (Supp. 1968).
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placement in her usual line of work while laundries, hospitals and housewives are demanding her services at wages of less than one dollar an
hour." 4
Arbitrary DiscriminationAgainst WIN Recipients
A narrow administrative interpretation of "good cause" for WIN
work or training refusals will undoubtedly concur with congressional
intent. The WIN criteria conflict, however, with the more liberal
tests utilized to evaluate searches for employment by workers idled by
their employer's unfair labor practices16 5 or business circumstances. 6
In backpay proceedings, the National Labor Relations Board charges
a delinquent employer with actual losses suffered by employees dis6
charged or otherwise discriminated against in violation of the statute. 7
In such cases, the employer (or offending labor organization) is entitled to a deduction from gross backpay "for actual [interim] earnings
by the worker and also for losses which he willfully incurred." 168 This
rule, which derives from the common law obligation of an employee to
mitigate damages in a wage contract dispute with his employer,169 applies
most commonly, in situations where the individual discriminatee has no
contract of employment and has been penalized for his "union" (i.e.,
protected concerted activities 170 ) prior to the commencement of the
collective bargaining relationship.
Moreover, the requirement of "willfulness" has been strictly interpreted. The Supreme Court clarified the concept to mean "a clearly
unjustifiable refusal to take desirable new employment." 171 Since that
164 The current statutory minimum of $1.60 per hour (and considerably less for
agricultural and laundry employees) applies only to industries "engaged in commerce
or in the production of goods for commerce." 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (1) (5), (b) (1966).
165 National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158
(1958).
166 Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 501 (1935).
167 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1940).
168 Id. at 197, 198.
169 See Mandelker, supra note 28, at 478.
170 Early in its administration, the Board reasoned that the statute protects concerted
activity although not specifically union activity since such discrimination discourages
formation of and membership in a labor organization. Stehli & Co., 11 N.L.R.B. 1397
(1939). In one case, the successful charging parties had been terminated for collaborating
with other nonunion employees in preparing a petition protesting the frequent hiring
of outsiders to fill a desirable company position. Phoenix Mutual Ins. Co., 73 N.L.R.B.
1463 (1947), enf'd, 167 F.2d 983 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 845 (1948).
171 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 199, 200 (1940).
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decision, the NLRB, but not all of the circuit courts 1 72 has never required the discriminatee to lower his sights in searching for work. Instead the Board in 1956 laid down the principle generally accepted by the
courts' 3 that the employee must at least make "reasonable efforts to
find new employment... suitable to a person of his background and
experience." 174 "Reasonable" means an "honest and good faith effort" 175
which need not, however, be successful, 176 and in broad terms may be
described as "conduct consistent with an inclination to work and to be
self-supporting." 177
Such concepts, most notably the emphasis on prior experience, are not
included among the WIN criteria for good cause refusals to accept
training or employment. 178 In many cases the status accruing from a
former trade of both female and male recipients (a displaced coal miner,
for example) may be a paramount feature of the client's self-image.
It would also seem relevant for therapeutic reasons for a placement official to consider whether a client truly wants to enter the work force,
provided children can be cared for either by responsible and willing
relatives or by professionals.
In still other respects the Board's search-for-work obligation imposed
upon its clients bears no relation to its Poor Law or AFDC statutory
counterpart. Although not required to do so, discriminatees, who out of
necessity do take lower paying jobs in other industries, are entitled to
be reimbursed for the difference in their earnings and are not thereby
deemed to have "abandoned" the labor market so as to create the presumption that they would have refused reinstatement if offered. 7 9 In
172 See Florence Printing Co. v. NLRB, 354 F.2d (2d Cir. 1965) in which the court
reversed a Board finding that a backpay claimant was not required to take similar
employment during the interim period at a lower wage scale.
The statute requires the Board to petition for enforcement of its orders in the circuit
courts of appeal, by-passing the district courts. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (f) (1958). "Aggrieved
parties" also may petition for review of Board orders. Id.
173 See, e.g., NLRB v. Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 360 F.2d 669 (5th Cir. 1966).
Southern Silk Mills Inc., 116 N.L.R.B. 769, 773 (1956).
175 NLRB v.Cashman Auto Co., 223 F.2d 832, 836 (1st Cir. 1955).
176 Mastro Plastics Corp., 136 N.L.R.B. 1342, 1344 (1962), enf'd, 354 F.2d 170 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 972 (1966).
177 Mastro Plastics Corp., 136 N.L.R.B. 1342, 1359 (1962).
178 WIN HANDBOOK § 412 E(1).
179 See, e.g., East Texas Steel Castings Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 1336, 1344, 1345 (1956), enf'd,
255 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1958) (The claimant, a welder, had accepted interim employment
as a cab driver); NLRB v. Moss Planing Mill, 224 F.2d 702, 704, 705 (4th Cir. 1955) (A
fireman chose agricultural work as a permissible, but not a mandatory alternative during
the backpay period).
174
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one case,,"0 the Board took cognizance of the plight of negro backpay
claimants, who were denied reinstatement after a strike in a clothing
factory, and took jobs as domestics because more suitable job opportunities for such women in New Orleans (circa 1955) were severely
limited.
While state unemployment insurance (UI) statutes, most of which require the idle worker to lower his sights after a reasonable time,' should
be brought into line with federal labor policy, 82 it is nevertheless true
that the system of unemployment compensation, both in England 8 3 and
in the United States, 8 4 has been far less degrading to the worker than
public assistance. Eligibility and disqualification requirements in most
states contain the "good cause" element of the 1968 welfare amendments as well as the implicit notion that work will be "available" 185 but
add the Anderson v. Schaefer 8 6 concept of "suitable." 187
The ultimate concern in unemployment insurance, which also accounts for the admittedly inadequate 8 8 benefits levels, 89 seems to derive
from the insurance concept itself (especially since only the employer
contributes).190 Inherent in this concept is whether the claimant seeks
Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 1414, 1447 (1966).
181 Mandelker, supra note 28, at 501.
182 Id. at 514.
180J.H.

183 In England, unemployment assistance, based roughly on the insurance concept,
became the major vehicle in this century (considerably more satisfactory to the English
than Poor Law administration) for income maintenance in bad times. DEScmwEiNrrz,
supra note 110, at 197-222.
184
See E. BURNS, THE AMERICAN SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM 33, 36 (1949).
185 According to Mandelker, all states require that a UI claimant must be available for
suitable work for which he does not have good cause to reject. Mandelker, supra note
28, at 487. All states also impose eligibility requirements that focus on a state of unemployment due to economic conditions, and disqualification criteria, including refusal
of suitable work and misconduct discharges, designed to deny benefits to those "voluntarily" unemployed. See U.S. BUREAU OF EmoYMENT SECURITY, COMPARISON OF STATE
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE LAWS E-3 (1967).
186 See note 45 supra.
(M c187 See Mandelker, supra note 28, at 481; see, e.g., N.Y. LABOR LAW § 593 (2)
Kinney 1965). Typically, a claimant must be "able and available" for "suitable" work
without attaching conditions or restrictions not usual and customary in that occupation.
Unemployment Comm'n v. Tomko, 192 Va. 463, 65 S.E.2d 524 (1951).
188 See note 190 infra.
189 The average weekly UI benefit nationwide in September, 1968, was $43.78, ranging
from a low of $27.54 in Mississippi to $52.05 in New Jersey. SOCIAL ScvCUTY BUn.
Jan., 1969, at 58. The enormous disparity in most states between average UI and public
assistance benefits dramatizes the current vitality of the traditional discrimination against
the "unworthy" poor. Id. at 60.
190 One official who played an important role in the formulation of the social security
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to qualify initially or later because of idleness resulting from his own
conduct. 191 Accordingly, most states impose varying periods of disqualification in instances of unemployment due to a labor dispute, regardless of where the merits' 92 lie. This imposition proceeds on the theory
that the claimant, having united for collective bargaining with his fellows,
somehow triggered his own unemployment. 19 2A On the other hand, such
claimants may be eligible at least for temporary cash assistance if in need
during the strike or lockout. Yet for practical reasons,193 few such cases
appear in the law books, and, where they do, welfare claimants who are
strikers have been successful in this country 94 but not in England. 95
Can the sharp distinctions relating to work requirements among the
three government programs be justified? I think not. To begin with,
UI and to a lesser extent the federal law of labor-management relations,
like the AFDC program, pay or cause to be paid cash assistance to
claimants who are actually (AFDC) or presumably (UI and NLRA)
in need.' 96 Cash assistance differs in practical effect from the two other
forms of monetary aid only in regard to the requirement of proof of
19 7
economic hardship.
program believes that UI benefits levels today would probably be significantly higher
and state laws would not have adopted their current adversary character if the statut6
had also provided for employee contributions. ALTZmYER, supra note 101, at 258. ,
191E. Burns, Unemployment Compensation and Socio-Economic Objectives, 55 YALE
LJ. 1 (1945). See Ford Motor Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n, 191 Va.
812, 63 S.E. 2d 28 (1951).
192 CCH 1967 Unemployment Ins. Rep. t 1980. Alabama, however, determines the
"reasonableness" of the dispute. Id. at 1980.197. A Virginia claimant, in a strike
situation, may not be disqualified ifr.he shows he is not "participating in or financing
or directly interested in the labor dispute which caused the stoppage of work." VA.
CODE ANN. § 60.1-52(b) (1) (Repl. Vol. 1968).
192A In an Ohio case, however, a state court upheld the right to UI benefits of a
worker who was laid off during a two-week period where the collective bargaining
agreement provided for a plant shutdown for other employees to take their vacations.
Dudley v. Morris, 6 Ohio App. 2d 187, 217 N.E. 2d 226 (1966).
193 The typical striker probably has resources sufficient to sustain him at least during a
brief stoppage. Employment elsewhere and union strike benefits may also be available
to him during prolonged stoppages or the worker, absent the encouragement of union
officials, simply may be reluctant to apply for cash assistance.
194
See Strat-o-Seal Mfg. Co. v. Scott, 218 N.E. 2d 227 (I1. App. Ct. 1966).
195 See note 53 supra.
196 Burns, supra note 191, at 36.
197 See Riesenfeld, The Place 'of Unemployment Insurance Within the Patterns and
Policies of Protection Against Wage Loss, 8 VAND. L. Rtv. 181, 217 (1955). Cf. Dudley
v. Morris, 6 Ohio App. 2d 187, 217 N.E.2d 226 (1966). The Court, taking a somewhat
different view, upheld relief payments to strikers on the theory that . . . "[UI] compensation is generated through lack of work with economic. need purely incidental there-
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Arthur Larson and other authorities in the UI field have argued against
the notion of permanent disqualification 9 ' on the theory that UI is
"primarily a public program whereby the government is systematically
dealing with the social problem of unemployment" "I (emphasis added).
After the varying periods of initial disqualification because of discharge
for misconduct or voluntary quit, most states reinstate such claimants
who are still idle, but actively seeking work, on the assumption that
economic conditions have created the evident hardship 20 suffered by men
and women who "ordinarily depend upon wages for their livelihood." 201
Even in the NLRA sector, where public policy considerations predominate, 2°2 it is not far-fetched to suppose that the five-man Board
in evolving its backpay doctrines has not sub rosa been influenced most
of all by humane considerations, or at least by the realization that an
employer most effectively frustrates the purposes of the Act by discriminatorily depriving employees seeking collective representation of
their livelihood.
In addition, strict adherence to the insurance concept for income
maintenance, with its concomitant invidious comparison to public assistance, was gradually abandoned in England 2 3 and was attacked as irrational in this country as early as 1938.204 Over the past three decades,
subsequent amendments to the UI, OASDI and AFDC tides of the Social
Security Act have further eroded the distinguishing characteristics
between social insurance and public assistance, 2 5 which, in the light of
the legislative history, had dubious validity to begin with. 2 6 The lines
to. Assistance is triggered by economic need with lack of suitable work purely incidental
thereto." 217 N.E.2d at 229.
198 Larson & Murray, The Development of Unemployment Insurance in the United
States, 8 VAND. L. REv. 181, 217 (1955).
199 Id. at 216. UI is primarily a "public welfare measure"; the tendency is to extend
and not restrict coverage. Ford Motor Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n,
191 Va. 812, 823, 63 S.E. 2d 28, 33 (1951).
200 Larson & Murray, supra note 198, at 216.
201 Id. at 215.
2
0 Proceedings under the NLRA do not contemplate the adjudication of private rights
as such. The Board acts in a public capacity to give effect to a public policy statute.
National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 362 (1940).
203 E. Burns, British Unemployment Programs 1920-1938, at 313-16 (1941), (A Report
Prepared for the Committee on Social Security); MiL.Err, supra note 113, at 22.
-o 4 Simpson, Should Unemployment Compensation be Based on Eainings or Need?,
28 AM. LAB. LEG. REV. 136 (1938).
;- WSee STEINER, supra note 60, at 249; Note, Charity Versus Social Insurance in Unemployment Compensation Laws, 73 YALE L.J. 357, 365, 366 (1963).
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have become even more "blurred and meandering." 207 Previously excluded groups have been brought within the UI umbrella and a diminishing level of participation in the work force has been required for
29
eligibility. 208 The inclusion of unemployed fathers in the AFDC grant
makes a mockery of the classic distinction between "worthy," but unemployed, workers and the idle poor. In fact, the cycle may have made
a full turn with the contradictory provisos in the 1967 amendments, possibly invalid on equal protection grounds. For eligibility purposes the
AFC-U claimant either had substantial recent employment or received
or qualified for UI, but does not now and cannot be permitted to receive
210
UI benefits.
As for the NLRB, it would seem that in backpay proceedings, where
for all practical purposes the Board and not the employer determines
which "benefits" will be paid to citizens utilizing the Board's processes,
the NLRB should be subject to the same obligation to act "reasonably." 211 Even early in its career the Board seemed to place equal stress
SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAMS, PROBLEMS AND PouciEs 2 (Haber & Cohen ed. 1960); Bums,

supra note 191, at 29-31.
20
7 Riesenfeld, supra note 197, at 222, citing tenBroek & Wilson, Public Assistance and
Social Insurance-A Normative Evaluation, 1 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 237, 245-51 (1954).
208
For an excellent chronology and summation of amendments to the Act see
ALTYmER, supra note 101, at 277-87.
209 42 U.S.C. § 607 (1964), as amended, (Supp. 1968).
21042 U.S.C. §§ 607(b) (1) (C)-2 (C) (Supp. 1968). This conflicts with prevailing social
insurance principles. Under New York law, for example, a worker's retirement and consequent receipt of OASDI benefits does not automatically render him ineligible for UI
on the grounds that he is no longer "available for employment" or has effectively limited
his earnings. In re Stringham, 29 AD. 2d 582 (N.Y.S. Ct. App. Div. 3rd Dept. 1969);
In re Gutterson, A.D.2d Index No. 12667 (N.Y.S. Ct. App. Div. 3rd Dept., Dec. 20,
1968) [interpreting N.Y. LABOR LAW § 600 (McKinney 1966)1.
211 King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968); Green v. Department of Public Welfare, 270

F. Supp. 173 (D. Del. 1967); Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp. 331 (D. Conn. 1967),
prob. juris. noted, 389 U.S. 1032, rehearing granted, 392 U.S. 920 (1968). In Green and
Thompson, the Courts declared unconstitutional state durational residency requirements
for public assistance. Green v. Department of Public Welfare, supra; Thompson v.
Shapiro, supra.
It is perhaps significant on the question of intertwined concepts between SI and PA
that in a recent appeal in Illinois state court from a lower court decision dismissing
a complaint attacking as unconstitutional ILI- UEMPLOYMrNT CoMPENsATION AcT
§ 500(c) (3) (1951), the appellants, inter alia, cite Thompson in support of their principal
argument .hat the statute, disqualifying an unemployed worker who moves to a locality
with substantially less favorable work opportunities, unlawfully restricts his right to
travel. Brief for Appellant at 26, Wadlington v. Mindes, Gen. No. 41820, (S. Ct. IMl.
Sept. 27, 1968).
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upon the collective right of employees to protest work conditions as
211
upon collective representation designed to avoid industrial strife. A
In the past few years the Board also has shown greater regard for the
individualrights of employees victimized by employer-union discrimination 212 and has refused as a matter of public policy to permit its governmental processes to perpetuate racially segregated bargaining units.1 3
Board law has been relied upon heavily in litigation brought under the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act 21 4 and state fair employment stat-

utes.215 In "fair representation" litigation commenced in state or federal
courts by an individual employee against his employer and/or union, the
Supreme Court has directed the federal and state judiciary to fashion a
body of federal labor law in all its parts. The Court presumably relied
upon principles evolved by the National Labor Relations Board. 2 6 In
fact, it is ironic that a government agency, created to protect the collective rights of workers under a statute ostensibly designed to facilitate
the "free flow of commerce," 217 should evidence greater concern for
human dignity in work refusal situations, than agencies charged with
alleviating economic hardship among unemployed individuals or welfare
and manpower agencies explicitly entrusted under the WIN program
with the rehabilitation of employable mothers.
FINANCIAL INCENTIVES UNDER THE

WIN PROGRAM

President Lyndon B. Johnson gave official recognition to the widely
held notion that any comprehensive formula for reform of the public
assistance system must include financial work incentives.2 18 Except for

a few local demonstration projects permitted by the Social Security
211A See note 170 supra.

212 See Local 12, United Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966).
213 Pioneer Bus Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 54 (1962).
214 See, e.g., Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1969).
2 5
1 See Holland v. Edwards, 307 N.Y. 38, 45, 119 N.E.2d 581 (1954).
2
16 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
217 National Labor Relations Act § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151
(1958).
218 Economic Report of the President 17 (Jan. 1967).
With minor exceptions, payments under public assistance are reduced dollar for
dollar of earnings by the recipient, removing any incentive to accept part-time
work. We should encourage self-help, not penalize it. It is time to put an end
to this 100 percent tax on the earnings of those on public assistance. I shall therefore ask Congress to enact payment formulas which will permit those on assistance
to keep some part of what they may earn, without loss of payments...
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Act,219 and work performed on and-poverty projects funded by the
Economic Opportunity Act, 220 Congress, until the 1967 amendments,
perpetuated "disincentives" for welfare recipients to seek employment
by requiring the states to deduct from the welfare grant every dollar
221
earned.
The income exemptions provided by the current legislation do represent progress of a sort. But, again, since these provisions also reflect
the overriding purpose of Congress to rehabilitate while cutting costs,
the incentive features may encourage an insignificant number of recipients to seek or willingly accept training or employment, and may
result at best in a token reduction in welfare expenditures. The incentives are too low. Ambiguities in the legislation may also permit local
aberrations, but most important, the incentive provisions discriminate
against the low-income (male) worker and in other ways ignore the total
economic context in which the employable mother finds herself.
The statute provides for three forms of incentive payments depending on the "sub-program." The recipient engaged in regular employment (priority one) is entitled to a "disregard" 222 of the first thirty
dollars of monthly earnings plus one third of the balance. If the individual is placed in a job training program (priority two) she receives,
instead of a regular salary, a flat-sum training incentive in the amount
22
of thirty dollars per month in addition to her usual welfare grant. 1
Finally, participation in special work projects (priority three) permits
the recipient to receive a combined payment equal to the assistance pay224
ment plus twenty percent of her earnings from the project.
It is true that the statute explicitly exempts all income from special
work projects as well as work training from consideration in budget
computations, 225 but this seems to conflict with the subsequent twenty
219 42 U.S.C. § 1310, 1315 (1964), as amended, (Supp. 1968). New York City had a work

incentive program available about one year prior to the 1967 amendments. N.Y.C. Dep't
of Soc. Servs., Pro. No. 67-38, Employment Incentive Program 5, 13 (1967).
22042 U.S.C. § 2732 (1964), as a'mended, § 2785, 2921, 2981 (Supp. I1, 1965-1966). All

work incentives for welfare recipients are now governed by the less generous provisions
of 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (8), 630 (1968). See HousE Commnva. oN WAYS AND MEANS, SoaAL
SECURrY AamrN MEN oF 1967, H.R. Doc. No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 107 (1967).

221 This rule apparently derived from the Common Law of the states reinforced by
the Social Security Act requirement that state agencies "shall, in determining need, take
into consideration any other income or resources of any child or relative .. !' 42 U.S.C.
§602(a) (7) (1964), as amended, (Supp. 1968).
222 42 U.S.C. § 602 (a) (8) (A) (ii) (Supp. 1968).
223 42 U.S.C. § 634 (Supp. 1968).
22442 U.S.C. § 602 (a) (19) (E) (iI) (Supp. 1968).
22542 U.S.C. § 602 (a) (19) (D) (Supp. 1968). One possible interpretation of Section D
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percent payment language. On the one hand, it is realistic to assume that
the language cannot be read literally;226 that at some hypothetical point,
perhaps when earnings reach the needs level, 22 7 the recipient enrolled
It is
in a special work project will be disqualified for AFDC assistance.
228
rare.
extremely
be
will
cases
such
also practical to assume that
More to the point is the expressed congressional intent that the
229
statutory minimum wage levels be observed for the applicable work,
but not the prevailing wages in the particular locale. 231 In other words,
municipalities will be furnished a cheap source of labor for cleaning
schools, mowing courthouse lawns, or other "extra" work23 ' that will
have the effect of depressing wages generally to the detriment of
23 2
organized industries.
Will the cash incentives orient recipients towards employment? In
many cases the answer undoubtedly will be yes, provided the job has
some human appeal. Even two or three dollars added to a budget cut
to the level of bare necessities will enhance the life of the recipient.
would disregard income from special work projects in determining eligibility but not
the amount of the cash grant. Columbia Center Working Paper, supra note 13, at 32.
226 California, however, rescinded its "seasonal work" policy effective January 1, 1968,
in large part because the 1967 amendments required that "an open-ended" portion of
earned income be disregarded in determining the amount of aid to be paid an AFDC
family. Cal. State Dep't of Social Welfare, Director's Newsletter, November-December
1968, at 18. The policy had the effect of granting supplemental assistance to seasonal
crop workers when their earnings were below established need and permitting them
to retain welfare eligibility for medical and educational but not financial benefits for
their children. Id. at 1, 18.
New York regulations do not regard special work project income as open-ended. The
"maximum permissible allowance" consists of the total of ordinary budget deficit plus
20% of adjusted gross earnings less expenses incident to employment. This total when
deducted from the MPA yields the assistance payment for a WIN participant. The New
York formula clearly indicates that an individual will no longer qualify when her employment income less the "disregards" equals the normal budget allowance. N.Y. DEP'T
OF SOC. SERVS., supra note 11, at 13; see note 228 infra.
227 See 13 WELFARE L. BuLL. 5 (June 1968).
228 Presumably, however, under priority one the WIN participant engaged in ordinary
employment will no longer be eligible for welfare assistance when the employment income charged against her needs, i.e., less the disregarded incentives, reaches the budget
level. In other words at that point the "budget deficit" would be reduced to zero. See
Columbia Working Paper, supra note 13, at 27.
229 42 U.S.C. § 633 (e) (4) (Supp. 1968).
230 SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, supra note 7, at 16. The original draft, however, contained a proviso that wages prevailing in the locality as well as the statutory minimums be
paid to WIN enrollees. Hovsa COMM. ON WAYs AND MEANs, supra note 220, at 105.
231 The project must not result in the displacement of employed workers. 42 U.S.C.
§ 633 (f) (2) (Supp. 1968).
232 See Mandell, supra note 51, at 13.
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Yet the comfort of a few additional dollars may be dissipated by the
physical and spiritual wear-and-tear of travel to and from a boring job,
aggravated by the not infrequent upset in schedule and possible loss of
earnings 133 caused by sibling illnesses or delinquent baby-sitters. The
training under priority two obviously must be particularly promising
to compensate for a $7.50 weekly allowance. For priority three, the
make-work character of this provision suggests dull employment at low
wages, which, coupled with the modest twenty percent bonus, may
23
create a new class of shiftless day laborer. A
The incentives provided under priority one for employment in the
regular work force, although more conservative than exemptions form23 4
erly available to recipients under the Economic Opportunity Act,
theoretically contain a fair measure of inducement towards employment.
In practice, however, unfilled jobs in the economy suited to the capabilities of recipients will inevitably be marginal. Congress laid down
few guidelines likely to deter administrators from referring clients to
such job vacancies and indicated a clear intent that priority in referrals
be accorded to ordinary employment. 2 5 Even assuming the best, however, in terms of adequate incentives and stimulating employment, the
success of priority one referrals under the WIN program in all parts
of the country will benefit only the AFDC mother. The discriminations
built into the WIN program have the potential effect of elevating the
low-income (negro) female while further degrading the father of her
26
children.
233 A number of commentators have emphasized the importance of a "stable income"
to welfare recipients. See E. Wickenden, Welfare Services, in J. BECKER, IN Am OF =
UNEMPLOYED 263 (1965).

In a study reported by the economist, Professor Leonard J.

Hausman of North Carolina State University, many recipients interviewed said, "Welfare
is better than a husband," because they could depend on welfare. L. Hausman, The
100% Welfare Tax Rate: Its Incidence and Effects 6, 1967 (unpublished Ph.D. thesis,
Univ. of Wis.).
233AAn AFDC-U recipient and a taxpayer attacked a county WIN program in
California in state court alleging, inter alia, that program funds were being misused
because participants were not being trained for gainful employment. The recipients,
most of them Spanish-speaking farm workers, received no language training. Instead
they were employed at tasks, general maintenance on public grounds and buildings,
for which they already were qualified. Baserra v. Bond, 2 CCH Poverty Law Rep.
1210.022.
234 The first $85 of employment income plus one-half of the excess over $85 each
month was disregarded. 42 U.S.C. § 2981 (1964).
235 SENATE Co.
. oN- FINANcE, supra note 7, at 2; see 42 US.C. § 632(b) (1964).
236 See notes 138, 149 supra.
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The statute provides incentives only to those unemployed while on
assistance. Low-income workers, who qualify in the future for grants,
are ineligible for WIN, as well as those presently receiving supplementary
assistance while employed 2. 7 Aside from the gross inequities that might
result among recipients in close proximity to each other, the denial of
the incentive to the already-employed has the effect of raising the budget
level of only one class of recipient. This would seem to conflict with
the basic statutory purpose of gearing assistance to need and raises an
equal protection issue. The justification for the discrimination type of
inducement to employment is grounded in economy considerations alone,
since financial incentives would presumably also encourage the worker
to stay on the job and advance his work situation. Even more unreasonably, the discrimination has the foreseeable consequence of demeaning
the male worker and discouraging his ambitions.
What satisfaction can the low-income worker on supplementary assistance derive from his employment when he sees his neighbor, an AFDC
mother, formerly idle, now boasting a combined employment-grant income perhaps fifteen dollars per week higher than his own? In states
like New York that participate in the unemployed parent segment of

AFDC and pay supplementary assistance to intact working families at
relatively generous levels, 238 the restricted incentive will offer a power237 At the present writing, there is some confusion on this point, which has not been
dispelled by the language of the statute, the legislative history, or the HEW regulations.
Elizabeth Wickenden argues that the statute discriminates against new applicants and,
in effect, establishes a higher standard of need for AFDC children with working
parents, over the level of benefits provided to those whose mothers stay at home.
Wickenden, supra note 13, at 22.
The Ways and Means Committee Report does not discuss this point, but the emphasis
on referrals to employment suggests that Congress must have intended to exclude from
receipt of the WIN cash incentives recipients already employed. Moreover, in explaining
why non-recipients with needs slightly above the needs level (and perhaps below the
combined welfare-employment income of the WIN enrollee) the Committee report
lays stress on the huge cost of adding these workers to the rolls as WIN participants.
HousE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANs, supra note 220, at 107. Inclusion of employed
recipients or applicants eligible for supplementary assistance would add to the costs
of public assistance income previously considered the cash grant. HEW, however, apparently takes the position that the WIN incentives are available to all employed recipients. Letter from Joseph A. Meyer, Deputy Administrator, Social and Rehabilitation
Services, HEW, to Director, Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law, Feb. 13, 1969.
Whatever the WIN policy may be among AFDC recipients, there is no question that
the cash incentives are not available to the rapidly expanding number of intact families
headed by a male worker receiving supplementary assistance in cities like New York
under the non-federal Home Relief program. See note 4 supra.
238
See note 12 supra.
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2 40
ful inducement for a breadwinner to "lose" 239 his job with impunity.
In New Jersey, a state which does not participate in AFDC-U and pays
non-categorical assistance at lower benefit levels, 241 the WIN incentives
will add to the existing economic pressures on a low-income worker
"to do the right thing" by leaving his family.

CONCLUSION

Perhaps the most dispassionate comment that can be made about the
"employable mother" amendment to the Social Security Act is as follows.
Congress in 1967, motivated to an uncertain extent by the increasingly
negro complexion of the welfare caseload in the south and the large
northern cities, nevertheless did no more than revert to an AngloAmerican tradition of total repression of the welfare poor that began in
feudal England with the breakup of the manor lands.
Local customs will permit utilization of the 1967 legislation to provide a supply of cheap labor for farmers, housewives, hotels and northern
sweatshops. Our regretful history of denying opportunities to black men
while asserting their lack of ambition,242 simply adds another chapter
to a long history that condemned as dissolute, immigrant Jews on New
York's lower east side,243 Irish Catholics who sought refuge from
hunger in Victorian England, 24 4 and before them, native-born, white
2 39

In an interview at my home (Brooklyn) on February 2, 1969, with two caseworkers
employed by the New York City Department of Social Services at a Brooldyn Welfare
Center, they advised me that they and their fellows had encountered a phenomenal increase in the number of employed recipients who, after the work incentive plan went
into effect, reported the loss of their jobs, received full-time assistance for a few months,
then resumed employment, often at their former jobs, and qualified for the WIN
incentives. So much for economy.
240 The statute does deny the WIN incentives to recipients who inter alia terminate
their employment "without good cause" within a period of not less than 30 days preceding the "disregard" month. 42 U.S.C. 5 602 (a) (8) (C) (i) (Supp. 1968). Proof of such
conduct probably will be difficult to obtain in many cases, however, and impossible when
employers cooperate in the plan by ostensibly laying-off the employees for lack of work.
241 See Graham, supra note 14, at 895.
2 42
See note 138 supra; George Washington Cable, a confederate war veteran, native
of Louisiana and one of the most popular writers of his day, made this still vital comment in 1884: "[the racist] forbids the Freedman to go into the water until he is
satisfied that [the Freedman] knows how to swim and for fear he should learn, hangs
millstones around his neck." G. CABLE, THE NEGRO QUESTION 69 (A. Turner ed. 1958).
243 N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1969.
244 See Thompson, supra note 110, at 437. During the famines young Irishmen committed crimes in order to be transported from Ireland. As a result of the British policy
of encouraging self-reliance by abandoning starving Ireland to laissez-faire and the
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Protestant indigents on both sides of the Atlantic.24 5
In this country, intellectual sustenance for the myth that poor people
are themselves responsible for their plight, was provided before 1935
by three decades of "laissez-faire" jurisprudence,246 influenced in large
part by the Yale sociologist William Graham Summer. 247 Summer was
a disciple of the Englishman Herbert Spencer,2 4 who found in America's
free enterprise economy a more fertile soil for his brutal interpretations
249
of the thoughts of that crusty humanist Adam Smith.
This does not, however, begin to explain the modern welfare system.
The Calvinism of Spencer, et al, exerts little influence on our welfare
politics. In fact, the 1967 amendments were enacted in the face of a
torrent of informed opinion, advocating humane reforms from the Left
and Right. Recently William F. Buckley, Jr. argued that the human
degradations inherent in the present system justifies an about face by
conservatives to support a negative income tax arrangement financed
by the central government.2 0 To be consistent with his new views,
Buckley should condemn the employable mother rule. Yet it is a fair
guess that Buckley's writings will have even less impact today than
did the enormously popular novels of Charles Dickens on reform of
251
the English Poor Law.
It is, instead, an almost mystical element in the Anglo-American character that insists, at great cost to both taxpayers and the poor, that an
operation of natural causes, "a bitterness without parallel took possession of the Irish
mind." C.
24 5

WOODHAM-SMITH,

THE GREAT HUNGER: IRELAND, 1845-1849 at 382, 407 (1962).

In England, during the winter of 1591, seventy-one poor and unemployed laborers
were whipped and burned "through the gristle of the right ear." WEBB & WEBB,
PART ONE, supra note 25, at 58. However, a report by the politician-philosopher John
Locke in 1696, which otherwise called for a system of slave labor for paupers, recommended only partial employment for mothers of small children. Id. at 111.
246 See Gamer, Justice Brewer and Substantive Due Process: A Conservative Court
Revisited, 18 VAND. L. REv. 615 (1967); R. GABRIEL, THE COURSE OF AMERIcAN DENIOcRATIc THOUGHT 292 (1956).
247 "There are no rights, The World owes nobody a living." R. HoFSTADER, SOCIAL
(quoting Sumner).
DARWINISM IN AMRICAN THOUGHT 51 (1955)
248 Henry George said of Spencer that he insists "each should swim for himself in

crossing a river, ignoring the fact that some have been artificially provided with corks
and others artificially loaded with lead." Id. at 113.
249 Smith, whose laissez-faire doctrines included protection by the state of the right
of laborers to organize and use the strike weapon, also condemned Settlement and
Removal legislation as an "evident violation of natural liberty and justice." A. SMm!,
THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 141, 142 (1937).
250 Buckley, supra note 2, at 2.
251 No genuine attempt was made to meet Dickens' objections to the Poor Law until
the appointment of a Royal Commission in 1905. HousE, supra note 88, at 223.
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expression of sympathy by legislators for those on the public dole constitutes a repudiation of our socio-economic system.252 The WIN legislation and related administrative regulations speak of client rehabilitation but patronize recipients by offering them "counseling" services.
This assumes that laziness (perhaps psychic in nature) is the key client
problem, and that satisfying jobs are available albeit at near-poverty wage
levels. In so doing, Congress ignored ample evidence accumulated by its
own committee that racial bias, automation, and harsh welfare regulations have combined to aggravate the current incidence of poverty.
The 1967 amendments seek to achieve economic savings, but they will
prove as expensive in human as well as financial terms as the early
settlement litigation. This litigation shocked the pioneer social worker,
Edith Abbott,25 3 and until a few years ago prejudiced her profession

against the involvement of lawyers and judges in the public assistance
254
sector.
Congress has confounded the social workers by threatening mothers
of small children (in the name of rehabilitation) with a stick in the
form of denial of assistance benefits, that can only hurt most the children
of the delinquent who refuses employment. Congress in 1967 also
offered a carrot draped in cash incentives which, while helpful, provides
disregards too low to motivate any except those already work-oriented.
The psychological impetus towards employment, resulting from
moderately increased income, will be offset by the hardships suffered
by the working mother who must lose an occasional day's pay. One can
visualize the conscientious caseworker-investigator phoning a client's
home to say: "Johnny, your mother didn't show up for work this morning. You say she took your brother to the hospital? Well, I have to talk
to her because the factory foreman wants to know when she'll return.
I won't begin to process a supplementary payment until she calls me."
Unlike Congressmen, caseworkers and law professors, it is the rare bluecollar worker who is paid for time off the job necessitated by the same
family emergencies that afflict the poor and affluent alike. Regulating
the income patterns of working women with pre-school children would
challenge the efficiency of any public agency. Yet Congress decided
to entrust enormous additional responsibilities over the daily lives of
poor women to caseworkers, employed in a bureaucracy that in many
areas shares in the contempt that society heaps on their clients.
252 See DouLAS, supra note 101, at 4.
253 E. ABBOTT, PUBLIC ASSISTANCE 145 (1940).
254 Id.; see KITH-LucAs, supra note 14, at 77.
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Ironically, the current statute at first glance clearly follows the tradition of discriminating in the mass against the "unworthy" poor as opposed to "workers," favored by the labor and unemployment insurance
laws. Yet the 1967 amendments unfairly discriminate against recipients
in the work force by narrowing eligibility for AFDC-U and denying
cash incentives to those already employed. The refusal of Congress to
insist that WIN enrollees be paid wages prevailing in the area will also
help depress wage levels generally.
In short, the contradictions between humane rhetoric and crude policies written into the statute, HEW and Department of Labor regulations will only perpetuate petty demoralizing cheating. Yet this
cheating is necessary to a client's survival and is encouraged by the
present welfare system. 255 The "compulsory-work-at-any-price-regardless-of-prior-experience" tone of the 1967 legislation will also dilute the
beneficial effects of participation by Department of Labor personnel in
the welfare sector.
Rehabilitation of clients and reduction of the welfare rolls will not
flow from more repressive legislation. It would seem that affluent Americans must first accept, without bitterness, the advice of Michael Harrington and others that hard core welfare dependency is here to stay. This
realization will permit the enactment of specific reforms, designed to
reduce dependency among the truly employable and the level of apathy
among the women presently compelled to spend most of their lives on
the rolls. These include: family allowances, national minimum standards
at decent living levels, a "negative income tax" or similar devices for a
more impersonal cash assistance distribution, the abolition of extensive
welfare investigations and the more subtle varieties of "substitute parent"
25 6
regulations.
Business measures include greater utilization of the employment potential of the young negro male, absent artificial racial barriers, encouraged by job training programs 257 with understanding teachers and
adequate cash allowances. The argument also has been made that increased productivity in the service industries would permit higher wage
levels for unskilled or semiskilled employment accompanied by a measure
255 See Graham, supranote 14, at 890-96.
256 See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
257See Cram Course for Negro Apprentices, BusiNEss WEEiK, Nov. 25, 1967; Brooks,
A job Program That Works, TrE REPORTER, November 16, 1967. Both articles describe
the successful cooperation of employers in work training efforts with the Joint Apprenticeship Program of the Workers' Defense League and A. Philip Randolph Educational
Fund.
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of upward mobility and increased social status.258 Political economists

must devise for the urban metropolises a comprehensive scheme for
reconciling the need to increase the tax base and attract new industries,
while insisting on wage levels high enough to avoid subsidizations of
marginal employers by payment of supplementary assistance to his employees.

25 9

Finally, it may be that any total solution to the welfare crisis must
bring the AFDC mothers and their men back into the socio-economic
mainstream. The community action component of the War on Poverty
by ordinary criteria has not been a success. 260 Agitation by the welfare
rights movement probably helped provoke Congress into enacting the
1967 amendments; but, in terms of morale, community action has produced a generation of political activists out of welfare recipients and
other poor persons who never in their lives had attended civic meetings.
If the dynamics of poverty persuade even a handful of local labor unions
in our large cities to make common cause with the rights movement,
the mythical gulf between the "worthy," i.e., working poor and abandoned mothers with small children will narrow considerably.
The alternative to such measures, leading to a total transformation of
the current archaic modes of aiding indigents, is, for the wealthiest nation in the world, to continue punishing innocent siblings for the supposed sins of their mothers. In the process, with the enactment of each
new retrogressive statute or regulation, like Dickens' parish overseers,
we will take pains to inquire whether our black Oliver Twist has said
his bedtime prayers when our only real concern is the cost of feeding
him.

258N.Y. STATE

DEP'T OF Soc.

SERvs., TE FoRaorrTN

SOCIAL SrEavic OuTLooK 21 (1969).
259 The New York City Planning

JOBS,

TH

URBAN

COALITION,

Commission. has devised such a "Plan for New York

City." The first of six volumes, containing a 75,00

word summary of the Plan,

will be published soon. N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1969, at 38, col. 5.
260See MOYNIHAN, MAXIMUM FEASIBLE MISUINDERSTANDING (1969).

